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CODE REVISION IN MARYLAND: THE COURTS AND
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE
WILLIAM H. ADKINS, I1*
On August 22, 1973, Governor Mandel signed chapter 2, Acts
of the First Special Session of 1973.' This chapter, which is one
of the first three revision bills presented to the General Assembly
by the Governor's Commission to revise the Annotated Code of
Maryland,' contains a comprehensive new article of the Anno-
* Member of the Maryland Bar; B.A., 1949, Williams College, LL.B., 1952, Harvard
Law School; former Revisor of Statutes and Director of the Governor's Commission to
Revise the Annotated Code of Maryland; State Court Administrator.
1. A ceremonial signing of this bill and actual signing of two other Code revision bills
took place on September 5, 1973.
2. The other two bills were chapter 6 (Agriculture), and chapter 4 (Natural Re-
sources), Acts of the First Special Session of 1973.
The Commission to Revise the Annotated Code [hereinafter referred to as the Com-
mission or as Code Revision Commission] was established in July, 1970 by Governor
Marvin Mandel. Senate President William S. James was named as its chairman and
House Speaker Thomas Hunter Lowe named as its vice-chairman. Other present members
of the Commission are: State Court Administrator, William H. Adkins, II (Talbot
County); County Solicitor R. Bruce Alderman (Baltimore County); Lowell R. Bowen, Esq.
(Baltimore City); Attorney General Francis B. Burch; Circuit Court Judge David L.
Cahoon (Montgomery County); James J. Cromwell, Esq. (Montgomery County); Dean
William P. Cunningham (University of Maryland School of Law); former Circuit Court
Judge Philip Dorsey, Jr. (St. Mary's County); S. Ronald Ellison, Esq. (Baltimore City);
C. Edward Jones, Esq. (Baltimore City); Deputy Attorney General Henry R. Lord; James
McSherry, Esq. (Frederick County); Assistant Attorney General J. Michael McWilliams
(State Department of Transportation); Court of Special Appeals Judge Jerrold V. Powers
(Prince George's County); Norman P. Ramsey, Esq. (Baltimore City); Roger D. Redden,
Esq. (Baltimore City); Zelig Robinson, Esq. (Baltimore City); Richard D. Rosenthal, Esq.
(Baltimore City); Doris P. Scott, Esq. (Cecil County); Shale D. Stiller, Esq. (Baltimore
City); Melvin J. Sykes, Esq. (Baltimore City); Howard J. Thomas, Esq. (Montgomery
County); Chief Legislative Officer Alan Wilner (Anne Arundel County); Charles W.
Woodward, Jr., Esq. (Montgomery County); and Circuit Court Judge James L. Wray
(Anne Arundel County). Former Speaker Lowe, now a Judge of the Court of Special
Appeals, remains a member of the Commission. The current House Speaker, the Honora-
ble John Hanson Briscoe (St. Mary's County), has assumed the vice-chairmanship.
Former Commission members include District Court Judge George W. Bowling
(Charles County); Frederick R. Buck, Esq. (Baltimore City); District Court Judge Walter
E. Buck, Jr. (Cecil County); Joseph A. Ciotola, Esq. (Baltimore City); Court of Appeals
Judge John C. Eldridge (Anne Arundel County); Dr. Carl N. Everstine (Director, Depart-
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tated Code dealing with courts and judicial proceedings.
The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, one of twenty-
one articles which will eventually constitute the Maryland Anno-
tated Code,4 reflects the concept adopted by the Commission that
ment of Legislative Reference); former States Attorney Samuel A. Green, Jr. (Baltimore
County); and former Supreme Bench Judge Thomas J. Kenney (Baltimore City).
Assistant Attorney General Fred Oken has frequently represented Commissioner
Burch.
In July of 1972 the staff, led by a director who is also State Revisor of Statutes,
became the Division of Statutory Revision within the State Department of Legislative
Reference. Ch. 182, [1972] Md. Laws 695. The members of the staff include: Revisor of
Statutes Avery Aisenstark; Associate Revisors Jack L. Kenner, Robert A. Melville, and
Dushan Zdravkovich; Assistant Revisors C. Elizabeth Buckler, Ralph Hughes, and Gerald
Winegrad; Editor-Librarian Carol Apperson, Assistant Editor Marie Marangoni; and Sec-
retaries Jean Carter, Phyllis Helmick, Earlene Johnson, Linette Johnson, and Alice Sears.
Former staff members, in addition to the author, include Revisor of Statutes J. Kemp
Bartlett; Assistant Revisors Bruce C. Bereano, Curtis J. Karpel, and Sharon K. Tucker;
Assistant Revisor David Anderson; and Secretaries Loretta Brewer, and Peggy Jones.
Those chiefly concerned with drafting the Courts Article were the author (titles 1, 4, 12 &
13), Mr. Zdravkovich (titles 3, 7, and 11), Mr. Bartlett (titles 9 and 10), and Mr. Melville
(titles 2, 4, 5, 6 & 8).
Governor Mandel delineated the rationale for the establishment of the Commission
as well as its mission at the organizational meeting of the Commission on September 18,
1970:
The last comprehensive revision of the Code of Public General Laws of Mary-
land was completed in 1888. During the intervening 82 years, a great number of new
statutes has been added to the Code, many on subjects not imagined by the codi-
fiers, with the result that the organization of what is now the Annotated Code of
Maryland and the relationship of its different subjects has lost the rational cohe-
siveness it once had. It is increasingly difficult to use the Code in a simple, intelli-
gent and efficient manner. Moreover, there now exist in the Code numerous incon-
sistencies in the statutory treatment of similar subjects which have no rational
justification ....
Therefore, I believe that this Commission should: Study these and related
problems; Prepare a new Code of Public General Laws of Maryland; . . . . Submit
its proposals and recommendations to the General Assembly of Maryland at such
time or times as it may deem expedient.
Minutes of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Annotated Code of Maryland 1
(Sept. 18, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Commission Minutes]. More extended discussion
of the establishment and purposes of the Commission may be found in Code Revision
Commission, Revisor's Manual (2d ed. Nov. 1973). See also Adkins, Good News for Mod-
ern Man, 4 MD. BAR J. 10 (Jan. 1972).
3. This new code article replaced in whole or in part 26 articles of the 1957 Code:
Md. Ann. Code arts. 5, 7, 9, 16, 17, 24, 26, 31A, 35, 36, 40, 42, 50, 51, 57, 60, 67, 75, 75C,
79, 80, 83, 87, 88, 90, and 96.
4. Those articles are:
Agriculture Local Government
Business Regulation Natural Resources
Commercial Law Occupations and Professions
Corporations and Associations Public Health
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Public Safety
Criminal Law Real Property
Education Social Services
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any article within the topically oriented Code5 should be a sub-
stantial repository for logically-related statutes.' Because of the
previous lack of any logical relationship in organization among
the various code provisions dealing with the judicial system in
Maryland, the Code Revision Commission gave high priority to
the revision of the Courts Article.7
The onerous task of clarifying the logical relationship among
code provisions related to the judicial system, while avoiding any
substantive change in these provisions,8 came to fruition in 1973
Elections State Government
Estates and Trusts Taxation & Revenue
Family Law Transportation
General Provisions
Twenty articles were originally proposed. See Commission Minutes (Apr. 26, 1971).
The twenty-first was added in 1972. Commission Minutes 2 (May 12, 1972).
5. There are basically two systems of code organization, the "alphabetical" system
and the "topical" system. In an "alphabetical" system the articles or major divisions of a
code are simply arranged in alphabetical order of the article names, as exemplified by the
Maiyland Code of 1888 and, basically, by the 1957 Michie Code (Maryland Code Anno-
tated). In a "topical" system there is an effort to group materials according to topic or
subject matter. Because the "topical" system produces, relatively, a few major divisions,
the Commission chose the "topical" approach to code organization. Subcommittee on
Classification and Numbering, Recommendation No. 1 at 9-10 (Mar. 24, 1971-revised
Apr. 15, 1971), as adopted by the Commission on April 26, 1971. See Commission Minutes
9 (Apr. 26, 1971).
6. Each article proposed by the Commission is divided into titles, subtitles, and
sections; the numbering system is similar to that of article 21 of the present Code. See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21 (1973). The new articles, most of which are to be published in
separate volumes, will be cited by name only rather than by number in order to avoid the
necessity of translating an article number into a subject heading. Commission Minutes 2
(May 12, 1972). See also Subcommittee on Long Range Planning, Recommendation No.
2 (May 1, 1972).
7. Consideration of those criteria adopted by the Commission as guides to determine
priorities for revision dictated the decision to give priority to the Courts Article. These
criteria included the general importance of the statutory material to the public as a whole,
or to identifiable portions of the public; the present state of organization and draftsman-
ship of the material; the recentness of legislative review of the material; the state of
obsolescence, unconstitutionality, or duplication observed in the material; and the pro-
posal of early revision of the material by any Commission member, state agency, or private
individual or group. See Staff Report No. 4, "Priorities for Revision" (Feb. 25, 1971),
adopted by the Commission on April 26, 1971 (Commission Minutes 14 (Apr. 26, 1971)).
8. The purpose of formal code revision, succinctly put, is "to improve the form of
the statutes without changing the substantive meaning." Texas Study Committee on
Statutory Revision, Report to Texas Legislative Council (Dec. 29, 1966). See also Wheeler,
Statute Revision: Its Nature, Purpose and Method, 16 TuL. L. REv. 165 (1943).
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 90 A.2d 686
(1952), has recognized the function of code revision to be clarification rather than substan-
tive alteration:
It is true that a codification of previously enacted legislation, eliminating re-
pealed laws and systematically arranging the laws by subject matter, becomes an
official Code when adopted by the Legislature, and, since it constitutes the latest
expression of the legislative will, it controls over all previous expressions on the
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after eighteen months of work by the Commission, its staff and
the Subcommittee on Courts.' Throughout these eighteen
months, the goal of an orderly presentation of a body of civil
judicial law guided the work of the Commission, 10 which deter-
mined that the Courts Article should have the following struc-
ture:II
subject, if the Legislature so provides. However, the principal function of a Code is
to reorganize the statutes and state them in simpler form. Consequently any
changes made in them by a Code are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity
rather than change of meaning. Therefore, even a change in the phraseology of a
statute by a codification thereof will not ordinarily modify the law, unless the
change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modify
the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code.
Id. at 416, 90 A.2d 689.
9. The initial revision effort was delegated in April of 1970 to a subcommittee which
organized the 1957 Code provisions relating to the Courts Article into twelve proposed
titles, including: (1) court structure and organization; (2) clerks, officers, sheriffs; (3)
jurisdiction-trial courts; (4) special causes of action; (5) venue, process, pleading, and
practices; (6) prohibited actions/limitations; (7) costs and fees; (8) juries; (9) evidence;
(10) judgments; (11) appeals; and (12) court supporting agencies. Staff Memorandum No.
1 to Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceedings, "Organization of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article" (June 16, 1971). Modifications of this organization were the
result of policy considerations and actions taken by the General Assembly, such as the
repeal of articles 20 and 52 of the 1957 Code by chapter 181, Laws of 1972, ch. 181, [1972]
Md. Laws 533. The Courts subcommittee consisted of Shale D. Stiller, Chairman, and
Commissioners Alderman, Burch, Cahoon, Ciotola, Cromwell, Powers, Ramsey, Sykes,
Woodward, and Wray.
10. After appraisal of the structure to govern the Courts Article, the Commission
and its subcommittee began formulating the substance of the article, drafts of which were
submitted to a special committee appointed by the Section Council of the Maryland State
Bar Association Section of Judicial Administration. This committee, later designated as
a special committee of the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., in order to testify in
connection with S.B. 1, was comprised of Joseph S. Kaufman, Chairman, and Messrs.
David H. Feldman, Lee M. Miller, and William J. Smith, Jr. Titles 1, 4, 8, 12 and 13 were
also presented to a special joint committee of the Legislative Council composed of Dele-
gate (now Judge) Martin A. Kircher, Chairman; State Senator (now Congressman) Robert
E. Bauman; State Senators Edward T. Conroy, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., James S. McAuliffe,
and Melvin A. Steinberg; and Delegates James A. Lombardi, John S. McInerney, Joseph
E. Owens, and Frank Heintz. See Code Revision Commission Reports to the Legislative
Council Nos. 3 (Aug. 4, 1972); 3A (Sept. 8, 1972); 3B (Sept. 21, 1972); 3C (Oct. 3, 1972);
3D (Oct. 5, 1972); and 3E (Nov. 1, 1972). Parts of the article were also submitted to such
interested parties as the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Chief
Judge of the District Court, the Maryland State Court Clerks' Association and the Sher-
iffs' Association.
After submission of the draft of the Courts Article to members of the General Assem-
bly during a Special Session which convened on July 30, 1973, the Senate Committee on
Judicial Proceedings and the House Judiciary Committee began twenty-one hours of joint
hearings on S.B. 1, the Courts Bill. The Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings re-
ported the bill favorably on August 3 with 100 amendments, mostly technical in nature.
After adoption of two additional amendments on the Senate floor, the Senate passed the
bill on August 15, an action which was subsequently confirmed by the House of Delegates
without further amendment. As previously noted, Governor Mandel signed the bill on
August 22, 1973.
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Title 1. Court Structure and Organization
Title 2. Court Personnel
Title 3. Courts of General Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction/Special
Causes of Action
Title 4. District Court - Jurisdiction
Title 5. Limitations and Prohibited Actions
Title 6. Personal Jurisdiction, Venue, Process, and Practice
Title 7. Costs
Title 8. Juries
Title 9. Witnesses
Title 10 Evidence
Title 11. Judgments
Title 12. Appeals
Title 13. Court Supporting Agencies
Assessment of the product of this extensive effort, which in
bill form embraced 382 pages with 166 pages of related cross-
reference tables, and of its effect on the substantive law of the
State is the purpose of this article. Examination and analysis of
the provisions of the new Courts Article will proceed on a title-
by-title basis.
TITLE 1: COURT STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
The seven subtitles of title 1 deal with general powers of the
courts, the composition and organization of the courts, judicial
compensation, and some administrative aspects of the court
structure. The specific subtitles are Definitions; General; Court
of Appeals; Court of Special Appeals; Trial Courts of General
Jurisdiction; District Court; and Judicial Salaries and Allow-
ances.
The definitional subtitle of title 1 reflects the Commission's
concern with the objective of classification of the law rather than
substantive change. For example, although provisions dealing
with judicial pensions'" were originally placed in title 1,11 this
material was transferred to article 73B because of the danger of
an even inadvertent substantive change resulting from formal
revision. 4 This approach also has the advantage of placing the
11. This structure was approved by the full Commission in September, 1971. Com-
mission Minutes 4-12 (Sept. 13, 1971).
12. See Md. Ann. Code art. 26, §§ 49-50C (Supp. 1973), § 125 (Supp. 1973), § 125A
(1973), § 144 (d)-(e) (1973), § 160 (Supp. 1973).
13. See Commission Minutes 5 (Sept. 27, 1972).
14. This transfer was accomplished by ch. 2, § 12 [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md.
Laws 408.
The Commission Minutes of September 27, 1972 reflect this concern with substantive
change:
1974
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judicial pension laws with other provisions dealing with pensions
of State employees.
The concern with the objectives of formal code revision is
also embodied in subtitle 2 dealing with general matters relating
to courts and judges. Section 1-201, pertaining to the rule-making
power, demonstrates the application of three objectives of formal
revision in the production of a currently viable statutory provi-
sion, those being the assembly of related provisions, the elimina-
tion of duplications and the repeal of obsolete or unconstitutional
statutes." Assembly of overlapping provisions, all related to the
same subject, has been accomplished by the combination, in sec-
tion 1-201, of article 16, section 99, and article 26, sections 1, 2
and 27. The revision has eliminated possible conflicts between
Maryland Rules'6 and former statutes and has removed obsolete
provisions dealing with terms of courts and recesses.' 7
The former provisions of article 26, section 25 prohibiting
rule-making for criminal cases have also been deleted as contrary
to the grants of rule-making power contained in sections 18 and
Commissioner Stiller looked with foreboding at the labyrinth of pension laws. No
commissioner was anxious to enter the maze. The Chaney report was noted, and
all recognized the additional complexities it exposed. Commissioners questioned
the need for including the pension material in the Courts Article, even if it could
be understood by the average human mind. It was noted that a Legislative Council
Subcommittee chaired by Senator Staten is considering some aspects of the pension
system.
Commission Minutes at 5 (Sept. 27, 1972). The report referred to in the Minutes was that
prepared by Robert L. Chaney, Esq. See Staff Report No. 16, "Courts Article - Title 1,
Court Structure and Organization" (Sept. 21, 1972). Some substantive revision of the
judicial pension system did occur at the 1973 regular session. See ch. 369, 545, 560 and
665, [1973] Md. Laws 820, 1182, 1202, and 1389, respectively. The Governor's Commis-
sion on Judicial Reform, in conjunction with a special committee of the Maryland State
Bar Association Section of Judicial Administration, has been examining some of the
problems of the pension system; the result of this effort was the introduction of S.B. 575
and H.B. 968 at the 1974 regular session. The latter was enacted on the last day of the
session and has been signed. Ch. 483, [1974] Md. Laws 1752.
Provisions relating to the Orphans Courts and to the Maryland Tax Court were also
not included in title 1. The limited jurisdictional ambit of the Orphans Courts as well as
the convenience of retaining the Orphans Courts material in article 93 mandated the
exclusion of that material. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 2-102 (1969). Maryland Tax
Court material was omitted since the Tax Court is an administrative agency and not a
court (MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 224 (1968)). See Commission Minutes 8-9 (June 15, 1972),
and Staff Report No. 12, "Courts and Judicial Proceedings - Some Preliminary Mat-
ters," at 5-9 (June 6, 1972).
15. Section 1-201 is based mainly on former article 26, section 25. See Md. Ann.
Code art. 26, § 25 (1973). Former article 26, section 144(b) dealing with the rule-making
power of the Chief Judge of the District Court is found in section 1-605(b) of the Courts
Article.
16. MD. R. P. 1.
17. See Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 2 (1973).
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18A of article IV of the Maryland Constitution.'8 For the same
reasons, a requirement that rules be submitted to the General
Assembly before becoming effective has been deleted. However,
the portion of former section 27 giving rule-making power to Or-
phans' Courts has been preserved by transferring that part of the
section to article 93, section 2-102.'1
The additional revision objective of the correction of ambigu-
ous, unclear, or misleading statutes is exemplified by section 1-
202(a). Section 1-202(a) is derived from former article 26, section
4 which purported to limit the power of the courts to inflict sum-
mary punishment for contempt. 0 Section 4 was fraught with
ambiguity because of judicial decisions holding that the power to
punish summarily for contempt was inherent in a court of record
and was not subject to limitation by statute." Article 26, section
4 was thereby interpreted to be merely declaratory of the common
law and not even an all-inclusive statement of the common law."
It was recognized, moreover, that it would have been unconstitu-
tional for the legislature to strip the courts of their inherent con-
tempt process. 3 Accordingly, section 1-202(d) merely notes that
a court may exercise the power to punish for contempt in the
manner prescribed by rule. The misleading limiting language has
been removed, and the development of the law of contempt is left
with the courts. The statute, in other words, is brought into con-
formity with the actual state of the law. This process produces
clarification without substantive change.
The next section of subtitle 2, section 1-203, which prohibits
the practice of law by judges, offers an example of the limited
kind of substantive change that may occur in formal revision.
This limited alteration illustrates the application of the formal
revision objectives of uniformity, consistency and the codification
of presently uncodified rules. Subsection (d) of 1-203 is substan-
18. MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 18, iSA (1972).
19. Ch. 2, § 4, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 394, recodified in MD. ANN.
CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 2-102 (1974).
20. Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 4 (1973).
21. See Robinson v. State, 19 Md. App. 20, 308 A.2d 712 (1973); Ex parte Maulsby,
13 Md. 625 (1859).
22. Weaver v. State, 244 Md. 640, 224 A.2d 684 (1966).
23. Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 57 A.2d 697 (1948), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 912 (1950).
Other recent cases in this general line of authority include McDaniel v. McDaniel,
256 Md. 684, 262 A.2d 52 (1970); Kandel v. State, 252 Md. 668, 250 A.2d 853 (1969); Roll
v. State, 15 Md. App. 31, 288 A.2d 605 (1972), afJ'd, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867 (1973);
Muckus v. State, 14 Md. App. 348, 286 A.2d 783 (1972); Goldsborough v. State, 12 Md.
App. 348, 278 A.2d 623 (1971).
1974
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tially a revision of article 26, section 144(b), although the revised
statute prohibits all private practice by any fulltime judge, while
former section 144(b) prohibited the practice of law only by dis-
trict court judges. 24 This section also addresses one particular
problem. The provision that a judge may not "profit directly or
indirectly from the practice of law" contained in section 1-203(d)
of the Courts Article raises the question of the renumeration re-
ceived by judges under agreements which entitle a judge as a
former partner in a law firm to receive, over a limited period of
time, payments which represent his interest in the firm's profits
as of the date he assumes his judicial office. Upon receipt of these
payments, is the judge then profitting "indirectly from the prac-
tice of law"? 5 This situation has never been addressed to any
Maryland appellate court, in part because the specific prohibi-
tion against indirectly profitting from the practice of law was
applicable exclusively to District Court judges and applicable to
them only since July, 1971.25
In any event, the Commission felt that a provision should be
included expressly permitting payment to a judge within certain
limits. In this context the Commission adopted section 1-203(b), 27
which as originally drafted was partially based upon an informal
decision of the American Bar Association Committee in Profes-
sional Ethics:
[U]pon accession to a judicial office agreement should be
reached as to the portion of services rendered by a judge [to
24. Md. Ann. Code. art. 26, § 144(b) (1973). Article 10, section 29 of the Code also
barred a judge from acting "as attorney or solicitor in any court of law or equity in this
State." Md. Ann. Code art. 10, § 29 (Supp. 1973). Additional limitations on non-judicial
activities of a judge are contained in article 16, section 199A, and article 93, section 5-
104(b), as well as in articles 33 and 35 of the Declaration of Rights, MD. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights, art. 33, 35 (1972).
In addition to these statutory provisions, the Court of Appeals in 1971 adopted Mary-
land Rule 1231, embodying CANONS AND RULES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS. Canon XXX prohibits
all private practice of law by a judge, as that position is defined in section 1-101(d) of the
Courts Article. Ethical Rule 5 contains a similar prohibition, although both Canon XXX
and Ethical Rule 5 provide certain exceptions with respect to "a judge of a court of limited
jurisdiction who is not forbidden by law" to practice. This exception in effect applies only
to Orphans' Court judges who are governed by the provisions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 10,
§ 30 (1968), and MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 2-109 (1974).
25. The Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceedings feared that this might
be the case. See Minutes of the Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceedings 5 (May
10, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Minutes].
26. Ch. 528, [1970] Md. Laws 1254. Prior to that time the language applied only
to judges of the former Municipal Court of Baltimore City. See Md. Ann. Code art. 26,
§ 125(d) (1973).
27. See Commission Minutes 3 (Sept. 27, 1972).
[VOL. XXXIV
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his former firm] and in the absence of such agreement, ap-
propriate steps should be taken to obtain their current value
under the partnership contract. This sum should then be
paid to the judge as rapidly as is possible under the circum-
stances .... 25
This draft was submitted to the Legislative Council Joint Com-
mittee with the comment that
the legislature could insist that the judge-designate forego
any such earnings. Or it could force him to take a lump-sum
payment before going on the bench. However, the former
approach could be financially hard on the judge, and the
latter would [could] impose financial difficulties on the
firm and an extremely adverse tax impact on the judge. In
either case, the effect would be to discourage able persons
from accepting judgeships.29
Accepting the desirability of the policy embodied in section 1-
203(b), the Committee adopted a modification indicating that
contingent fees should be taken into account in fixing the liqui-
dated value of the judges' interest in his former firm.3 0
Subsection 1-203(b) was further altered by the Senate's
adoption of an amendment requiring that any remunerative
agreement between the judge and his former firm be reduced to
writing and filed with the Secretary of the Maryland Judicial
Conference .3 Even with Ethical Rule 7,32 which requires a judge
to report certain income, other than his judicial salary, to the
Secretary of the Maryland Judicial Conference, the inclusion of
a filing requirement in section 1-203(b) clearly maximizes the
strength of the statute.
It was nevertheless recognized during the committee hear-
ings at the 1973 special session that a judge receiving any pay-
28. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL DECISION, No. C-676 (Aug. 8,
1963).
29. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3C to the Legislative Council, at 3 (Oct.
3, 1972).
30. Minutes of the Special Committee to Revise Proposed Recodification of Laws
Pertaining to Courts and Judicial Proceedings at 1 (Oct. 17, 1972) and at 1 (Nov. 14, 1972).
This modification appears as the last sentence of section 1-203(b).
31. Amendment No. 101, proposed by Senator Bishop and adopted by a vote of 32
to 2.
32. Ethical Rule 7 was superseded on February 15, 1974, by a broad financial disclo-
sure rule requiring the income reporting formerly included in Rule 7 as well as much
broader disclosure. Under Ethical Rule 7 judicial financial reports were available to the
Court of Appeals, the Commission on Judicial Disabilities, and the Judicial Ethics Com-
mittee created by Ethical Rule 14; under the February 15th order disclosure statements
are matters of public record.
1974
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ments from his former firm had an identifiable interest in the
firm's financial stability and had, at least indirectly, an interest
in the firm's success in litigation. Consequently, an amendment
was proposed to require a judge to disqualify himself in any case
in which his former firm appeared during the period the judge was
receiving payments from the firm .33 The amendment was rejected
by vote of 11 to 10 in committee, but it was offered again on the
Senate floor, 34 where it was adopted by a vote of 31 to 4. The
amendment appears as subsection (c) of sec. 1-203. 31
Subtitle 3 of title 1, dealing with the Court of Appeals, repre-
sents the application of the code revision objective of symmetry.
Although informationally unnecessary since provisions involving
the structure or organization of the Court of Appeals are found
in the Constitution,36 subtitle 3 was added to provide mention of
the State's highest court, a useful place for the listing of cross-
references to constitutional provisions, and location for any future
statutes bearing on the court's organization or structure.37
The structure and organization of the Court of Special Ap-
peals, on the other hand, are mainly dealt with by statute. The
provisions of former article 26, section 130 appear in subtitle 4
without substantive change. The portion of Section 130 defining
appellate judicial circuits is omitted because circuits are de-
scribed in the Constitution. 31
Organizational provisions relating to trial courts of general
jurisdiction, the focus of subtitle 5, are also in pertinent part,
described in the Constitution. 39 However, section 1-503 now lists
in convenient form the numLer of Circuit Court judges authorized
33. Actually, a provision to this effect was proposed by Commissioner Richard Ro-
senthal during the Commission's consideration of title 1. The proposal was rejected as
beyond the scope of code revision. Commission Minutes 3-4 (Sept. 27, 1972).
34. Amendment No. 102, proposed by Senator Bishop.
35. Although this disqualification might be regarded as a substantive change, it
should be viewed merely as a legislative definition of the "significant financial interest"
in a matter which requires disqualification. Ethical Rule 2. See also Canon IV, providing
that a "judge's official conduct should be free of impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety." See generally Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal
Courts, 86 HARV. L. REv. 736 (1973).
36. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 4, 4B, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 18A (1972).
37. General provisions dealing with appellate jurisdiction appear in title 12 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which is chiefly based on former article 5 of the
Maryland Annotated Code. See note 225 et seq. infra and accompanying text.
38. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14. Former section 131 of article 26, authorizing the
General Assembly to add judges to the Court of Special Appeals, was omitted as an
unnecessary statement of what the General Assembly may do in any event.
39. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (1972), § 20 (Supp. 1973), § 21 (1972) and §§ 27-
33 (1972).
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for each county and the number of Supreme Bench judges pro-
vided for Baltimore City.40
The concise presentation of information was also the focus of
subtitle 6, describing the organization of the District Court and
the powers and duties of its chief judge. Its eight new sections are
the result of rearrangement of all or parts of former article 26,
sections 139, 140, 141, 150, 151, and 153 of the 1957 Code.
Subtitle 7, covering judicial salaries and allowances,4'
clarifies existing law in the area. Section 1-701, for example, pro-
hibits dimunition of a judge's salary "during his continuance in
office." Although this provision in part duplicates Constitutional
provisions, A2 Section 1-701 was included since there appears to be
no precisely similar constitutional provision applicable to judges
of the Court of Special Appeals.43
Sections 1-702 through 1-705 set forth present law governing
judicial salaries, including the changes enacted by chapter 343,
Acts of 1972. 44 This act eliminated from the Code the listing of
specific judicial salaries, relegating the fixing of judicial compen-
sation to the annual budget (subject to the anti-diminution provi-
sion) and providing for automatic salary increases in certain cases
of general salary increases to other State employees.45
Section 1-706 makes it clear that all judges are entitled to
reimbursement for expenses incurred in travel while on court
business. The provision of subsection (c), prohibiting an appel-
late judge from collecting reimbursement for normal commuting
expenses, now in the Code, reflects the prevailing practice in early
1972 when title 1 was first drafted. Subsequently, this practice
was changed, but word of the change did not reach the Commis-
sion until the 1973 extraordinary session had begun. Representa-
tives of the judicial bench did not, however, request any amend-
40. The third Circuit Court judgeship provided for Harford County took effect on
July 1, 1974. See ch. 2, § 21d, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 431.
Heretofore, finding the number of judgeships alloted to a particular county or to
Baltimore City was not an easy task. For example, to ascertain this information with
respect to the Sixth Circuit, it was necessary to examine article IV, section 21 of the
Constitution; article 26, sections 323 and 326 of the 1957 Code; as well as chapter 894,
Laws of 1965, and chapter 450, Laws of 1960.
41. For a discussion of the arrangement of judicial pension provisions, see note 14
supra and accompanying text.
42. See MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 14, 24, 31, and 41H (1972).
43. Similar language appeared in former article 26, section 130 of the 1957 Code.
44. Ch. 343, [19721 Md. Laws 951.
45. Chapter 373, Laws of 1972, amended article III, section 52(6) of the Constitution
to permit the General Assembly to increase or reduce the judicial budget, subject to the
proviso that "the salary or compensation of any public officer shall not be decreased
during his term of office; .... " Ch. 373, [1972] Md. Laws 1235.
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ment of the provision."
Section 1-707 continues provisions relative to certain benefits
available to judges blanketed into the District Court in 1971. It
is a transitory provision which should be repealed when the last
of these judges leaves the bench.
TITLE 2: COURT PERSONNEL
Having described the general structure and organization of
the courts to the extent contained in statutes, the Courts Article
then proceeds to discuss other officials needed to carry out the
daily work of the courts.
In six subtitles" multifarious statutes dealing with the court-
related functions of such officers as clerks and sheriffs are gath-
ered together. However, the Courts Article does not include a
discussion of other functions, such as the license-issuing duties of
clerks or the law-enforcement duties of sheriffs.
An organizational lapse occurs at the beginning of title 2,
entitled Court Personnel. Section 2-101, containing definitions,
applies to the entire title, and not just to subtitle 1 as the reader
would be led to believe. This definitional section should have
been placed in a separate subtitle, as was the definitional section
in title 1, to prevent confusion.
The following section, section 2-102, is a broad provision per-
mitting a court to appoint temporary officers in specific proceed-
ings. Some of the common types of officers, both statutory and
non-statutory, are listed, such as auditors, surveyors, masters,
and examiners. Appointment of "counsel for a party" is sanc-
tioned "if authorized by law or rule" in order to prevent conflict
with section 6 of article 27A which permits a court to appoint
counsel within the Public Defender System for a criminal defen-
dant under certain circumstances.48 There is also a blanket au-
thorization permitting the appointment of any "other officer"4 in
order to enable the court to appoint whichever officers it needs
to carry out its duties.
Replacement of obsolete provisions in the Code is the focus
of the next section in subtitle 2. Section 2-103 makes it clear that
46. S.B. 749 [1974] would have adjusted this situation, but was not enacted.
47. The six subtitles include a general rule dealing with officers, oaths, and bonds;
two specific ones relating to clerks and sheriffs; and three subtitles containing additional
material relating to particular court levels (appellate, courts of general jurisdiction, and
the district court).
48. See MD. ANN. ConE art. 27A, § 6 (Supp. 1973).
49. The basis for this blanket authorization is article IV, section 9 of the Maryland
Constitution.
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when any officer covered by title 2 leaves office for any reason,
all duties then unperformed, including collection of fees, devolve
upon his successor. Heretofore, when a sheriff died or otherwise
left his office, statutes of ancient origin required cumbersome
procedures to be followed.5" Some of these provisions authorized
the former sheriff or his personal representative to collect fees
after the sheriff left office or died;" this arrangement was quite
appropriate when the sheriff was compensated by his fees, but it
is totally inappropriate today, when all sheriffs are salaried.2 The
removal of these obsolete provisions simplifies the law in this
area.5
Section 2-104, on the other hand, synthesizes numerous for-
mer provisions applicable to court officers, dealing with oaths or
affirmations." In a similar manner, section 2-105 consolidates in
convenient form a variety of former statutes relating to official
bonds.5 This section simplifies and updates some requirements
as well. For example, while former section 3 of article 87 required
a sheriff to give a new bond annually, the revision section, section
2-105(f), provides that all bonds shall remain in effect during the
officer's tenure in office.
Filling a gap in the law and providing consistency are the
basis for section 2-106 relating to the failure to qualify for office.
Under the 1957 Code, a person required to take an oath of office
but who failed to do so was deemed to have refused the office. 56
However, a sheriff who took the oath but failed to give bond
vacated the office.57 While other officers in the same situation
were merely prohibited from receiving fees,5" subsection (d) of
section 2-106 now equalizes the treatment for all officers required
to be sworn or bonded, so that any officer who fails to take the
oath or to provide the required bond is deemed to have refused
the office. The office is thereby rendered vacant.
50. See Md. Ann. Code art. 87, §§ 21-25, 33-34, 36 and 39 (1969).
51. Md. Ann. Code art. 87, §§ 33-34 (1969).
52. See MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 2-309 (1974).
53. As originally drafted, section 2-103 included a statement that every officer "is
personally responsible for the performance of his official duties." The Senate struck out
this provision, probably because it was thought to be unnecessary.
54. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 6 (1973); art. 26, §§ 14, 153(c) and 154(d)
(1973); art. 70, §§ 4, 13 (1970); and art. 87, § 6 (1972).
See also MD, CONST. art. I, § 6 (which contains the prescribed oath of office) and art.
XV, § 10 (1972) (which is referred to in § 2-104(c)).
55. Included are Md. Ann. Code art. 17, §§ 46, 46B and 47 (1973); art. 26, §§ 149(e),
154(d) (1973); and art. 87, § 2 (1969).
56. Md. Ann. Code art. 70, § 11 (1970). See also MD. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1972).
57. Md. Ann. Code art. 87, § 4 (1969).
58. Md. Ann. Code art. 17, §§ 38, 48 (1973).
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The provisions of subtitle 2 of title 2, derived from former
provisions of article 17, covers the general duties of clerks of court.
The subtitle lists common functions of clerks, but the list is not
intended to be all-inclusive, as indicated in section 2-201. Rather,
this subtitle is intended to reflect current practices and to pro-
mote flexibility and ease of administration by speaking in general
terms.
Some attention, however, should be given to section 2-203,
which replaces article 10, section 9. That section, if construed to
limit free inspection of the records of a clerk of a court to attor-
neys or their agents, would be totally inconsistent with the provi-
sions of article 76A, which, subject to some limitation, allow
inspection of public records by "any person."59 This possible in-
consistency is now obviated by section 2-203 which, while pre-
serving the confidentiality of those records protected by law or
order of court,6 allows public inspection.
While administrative burdens may have been increased by
the provisions of section 2-203, sections 2-204 and 2-206 are de-
signed to alleviate administrative problems in the court system.
section 2-204 allows the judge exercising the functions of adminis-
trative judge in a county to set the hours of a clerk's office,6" while
section 2-204 allows the county administrative judge to approve
the proposed destruction of certain records."
The General Assembly struck from the Courts Article section
2-207, which provided a $100 penalty for the failure of a clerk to
perform certain duties.6 3 The apparent view was that the $100
penalty was relatively unimportant and that a person injured by
a clerk's failure could recover under the clerk's bond or in a tort
or similar action.
Subtitle 3 deals with sheriffs. Aside from a minor legislative
clarification of the language of section 2-301, pertaining to service
of process, the subtitle contains very little changes. Its lengthiest
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3(a) (Supp. 1973).
60. For example, certain juvenile records are confidential. See MD. ANN. CODE, Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-838 (1974).
61. The question arises whether this provision in any way conflicts with article IV,
section 10 of the Constitution, which provides that the "Judges" of a court may make
"rules and regulations for the government of... Clerks and for the performance of the
duties of their offices .... " [emphasis supplied]. See also MD. R.P. 1215.
62. This was a legislative modification. See Amendment No. 12. Formerly, and
somewhat ambiguously, this power was vested in the county administrative judge or in a
majority of the resident circuit court judges. See Md. Ann. Code art. 17, § 1A (1973).
63. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, §§ 9, 32, 40 and 43 (1973); art. 75, § 89 (Supp.
1972).
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provisions cover sheriffs' salaries and expenses. 4
However, section 2-302 does modify the present law, by pro-
viding that a writ of execution shall be returned to the court
which issued the writ. Under Maryland Rules 5 and Maryland
District Rule 622.h.2., if the writ issues to a sheriff of a county
other than the one in which judgment was entered, i.e. the county
in which the property was located, the writ was returned to the
court for the county to which the writ was sent. Each of these
positions no doubt has attendant advantages and disadvantages,
although it is impossible to determine exactly why the Commis-
sion proposed the adoption of the first position except than
through inadvertance.66 In any event, the Court of Appeals su-
perseded the statute by adopting amended Maryland Rule 622.h.
on December 13, 1973.7
Subtitle 3 does contain a number of ancient statutes specify-
ing the duties of sheriffs and the consequences of failure to per-
form them. Although the Commission recognized the obsoles-
cence of many of these statutes, it concluded that the legislature
should make any appropriate changes because of possible policy
considerations. The General Assembly did not take any action on
these provisions at the special session, although further legisla-
tive consideration of these matters is likely.
Subtitle 4, a brief discussion of personnel in appellate courts,
64. See MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 2-309 (1974).
65. MD. R.P. 622.h.2.
66. Subtitle 3 was considered by the Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings on March 6 and March 26, 1973, and by the full Commission on May 6 and 7, 1973,
but the Minutes of all of those meetings are silent on this particular point. Nor is there
any discussion of it in Staff Memorandum No. 14 to the Subcommittee on Courts and
Judicial Proceedings (Feb. 21, 1973), in Staff Report No. 3F (Apr. 17, 1973), or in Code
Revision Commission, Report No. 31 to the General Assembly (July 16, 1973).
67. MD. R.P. 622.h. now states:
A writ of execution so issued and directed to the sheriff of another county shall be
made returnable to the court for the county to which it may be sent. If sent to the
City of Baltimore, the writ shall be returnable to the Superior Court of Baltimore
City. A copy of the return shall be sent to the court which issued the writ.
S.B. 81 [19731, enacted on March 8, 1974, ch. 32 [1974] Md. Laws 496, conforms
the section to the amended rule by stating:
A writ of execution or attachment shall be directed to the Sheriff of the county
where the property is located. He shall execute the writ and file the return pursuant
to the Maryland Rules or the Maryland District Rules.
Ch. 32, [19741 Md. Laws 496.
68. Examples of this type of provision are the amercement and contempt provisions
of section 2-304 of the Courts Article. Another example of an ancient provision is that of
section 2-308(b), based on former section 40 of article 87, which indicates that a sheriff
"is answerable for all penalties imposed on an inhabitant of his county of a court of the
State unless he shows that the person liable for the penalty is insolvent."
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consolidates several portions of the 1957 Code." However, defini-
tion of the term "appellate court" is found outside of the subtitle,
in section 2-101, and a discussion of the general duties of the
clerks of these courts is not included in subtitle 4, since subtitle
2, applicable to all clerks, contains these provisions.
Subtitle 5 contains specific provisions relating to employees
of trial courts of general jurisdiction. The main thrust of this
subtitle is in the direction of simplification and consolidation.
Thus, section 2-501 gives blanket authority to the judge to employ
appropriate personnel.70 However, although section 2-502 lists
some specific dockets to be maintained by the clerks of courts of
general jurisdiction, most provisions of this type will be codified
with the relevant substantive law. Finally, the provision regard-
ing criers in section 2-506 was added by the General Assembly
after ascertaining that this office still exists in a few counties.7'
Subtitle 6 is nothing more than a restatement of the statutes
dealing with District Court officers and employees. Transitional
matters relating to retirement or health benefits for certain
blanketed-in District Court employees are not appropriate for
codification and appear elsewhere in the Courts bill.72
TITLE 3: COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION-
JURISDICTION/SPECIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
As already noted,73 the Commission's original plan was to
devote title 3 of the Courts Article to jurisdictional provisions for
all courts and to devote title 4 to statutes pertaining to special
causes of action. These early plans envisaged an internal title
breakdown generally on the bases of law, equity, and District
Court. However, three reasons argued against the use of this or-
ganizational structure. First of all, it is not always easy to deter-
mine, on the one hand, what is related to subject matter jurisdic-
tion and, on the other, what is not jurisdictional but, rather, is
concerned with a "special cause of action." Second, the use of this
distinction presupposes that the code user will draw the same
lines as the Commission in this somewhat subjective field. Third,
69. These portions were mainly former sections 45 and 46A of article 17 and sections
29 and 29A of former article 26.
70. This section deals with employment of permanent personnel as opposed to sec-
tion 2-102 which is concerned with appointment of temporary officers in particular cases.
See note 47 et seq. supra and accompanying text.
71. Amendment No. 16.
72. Ch. 2, § 15, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 428.
73. See note 9 supra.
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the use of the historically-appropriate but functionally-foolish
distinction between law and equity assumes that the user already
knows some of the answers he is presumably seeking.
Consequently, title 3 emerged as a comprehensive collection
of subject-matter jurisdiction and special causes of action with
respect to courts of general jurisdiction. Structural divisions
based on law and equity were eliminated, and similar provisions
for the District Court were placed in title 4. Because of its
breadth, title 3 is the longest title in the Courts Article, being
composed of nine subtitles discussing essentially civil jurisdic-
tional provisions relating to: absent persons; arbitration and
award; attachment; declaratory judgment; defamation; family
law; habeas corpus; juvenile causes; and wrongful death.74 In or-
ganizing this voluminous material, the Commission attempted to
place a jurisdictional or special cause of action provision with the
substantive law to which it relates, if appropriate within the total
sphere of organization of the revised code or if very difficult to
separate from related substantial provisions; other jurisdictional
and special causes of action material appear in title 4.
Since title 3 includes statutes concerning civil subject matter
jurisdiction or creating civil special causes of action, criminal
matters and some civil proceedings having a close relationship to
criminal law were not included.75 Likewise, venue provisions are
excluded." Substantive or procedural details are also often ex-
cluded; for example, although subtitle 6, entitled family law,
contains jurisdictional measures relating to divorce, alimony,
adoption and the like, provisions relating to grounds for divorce
are excluded as are the provisions of article 89C, the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.77
Despite its length, title 3 engenders very few changes in the
statutes that have been recodified. Its major virtue, if any, is from
the viewpoint of organization. However, subtitle 1, entitled Ab-
sent Persons, although derived from the Uniform Absence as Evi-
74. These subtitles are derived from the following provisions: Md. Ann. Code art.
16, §§ 200-211 (1973); Md. Ann. Code art. 7 (1968 and Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art.
9, § 1 (Supp. 1972), § 2 (1968), § 14 (1968); Md. Ann. Code art. 31A (1971), art. 88 (1969),
and art. 75, § 6 (1969); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, §§ 1, 2, 22, 29, 66(a) and 68 (1973), art.
16, § 24 (Supp. 1973), art. 42, §§ 1, 3, 4, 14, 17 (1971), art. 42, § 19(Supp. 1973); Md.
Ann. Code art. 26, § 51 (1973), §§ 70-71A (Supp. 1973), § 91 (Supp. 1973), and 88 92-
101 (1973); and Md. Ann. Code art. 67 (1970, Supp. 1973).
75. One such civil proceeding is that included within the purview of the Defective
Delinquent Law. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B (1971, Supp. 1973).
76. Venue provisions appear in title 6 of the Courts Article. See note 143 et seq. infra
and accompanying text.
77. This provision will be placed in the Family Law Article.
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dence of Death and Absentees' Property Act,78 offers a good exam-
ple of the rare instance of major modification of a uniform act.
Former section 202 of the Act called for a rather complex receiver-
ship proceeding and carefully delineated the duties and powers
of the receiver who had charge of the absentee's property." Subse-
quent to the enactment of section 202, the legislature adopted
article 93A, s1 entitled Protection of Minors and Disabled Persons,
which authorized the appointment of a guardian with broad au-
thority"' to administer the estate of a person if a court determines,
inter alia, that "the person is unable to manage his property and
affairs effectively because of. . .disappearance . ".8.."2
Early in its proceedings the Courts Subcommittee raised the
question of whether the article 93A guardianship proceedings
should not be substituted for the article 16 receivership proceed-
ings in order to provide uniformity and simplicity. 3 Resistance to
this proposal prevailed in the Subcommittee, 4 because of the
extent of substantive change involved and because of a feeling
that the matter could best be considered in the context of a study
of the entire substantive law dealing with absent persons. 5 How-
ever, the full Commission subsequently adopted the article 93A
guardianship provisions, and section 3-104 now incorporates
these provisions by reference."
Although the adoption of the article 93A guardianship pro-
ceedings help to simplify the provisions relating to absent per-
sons, the state of this portion of the law still necessitates further
study by the legislature. Section 3-107 is one example of an area
within subtitle, 1 requiring further consideration. This section
provides for an absentee insurance fund out of which certain per-
sons whose property has been distributed after disappearance
may obtain some reimbursement. However, practical experience
78. Md. Ann. Code art. 16, §§ 200-212 (1973). This Uniform Act was promulgated
in 1939 and has been adopted in only two states other than Maryland. See TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-1801 to 30-1815 (1956); WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 268.22 to .34 (1967).
79. Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 202 (1973).
80. Ch. 4, [19691 Md. Laws 105.
81. See MD. ANN. CODE, EST. & Tr. Art., §§ 13-203, -204, -206, and -208 to -222
(1974).
82. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 13-201(b) (1974).
83. Subcommittee Minutes at 6-7 (Nov. 13, 1972) and at 2-3 (Feb. 12, 1973).
84. Id. at 1-2 (Mar. 27, 1973).
85. See Staff Memorandum No. 17 to the Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial
Proceedings (Mar. 30, 1973).
86. Another change in the Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees'
Property Act is the elimination of the jury trial provision of section 200(1) of article 16.
Since the proceedings are in equity, this provision seemed inconsistent with normal equity
practice.
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has shown that this provision serves no useful purpose, since in
twenty-three years only six payments, totaling $2,306.43, have
been made to this fund and no claims have ever been made
against it.17
Subtitle 2, entitled Arbitration and Award, is also based
upon a uniform act, the Uniform Arbitration Act, to which the
Commission added a related statute, former section 18 of article
75.88 Although many changes in the Uniform Arbitration Act are
merely in style and organization,89 two alterations are worthy of
note. The first modification is found in section 3-202, which is
derived from former article 7, section 16, the provisions of which
gave a Maryland court jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration
agreement "providing for arbitration in this State." Since the
legislative committees were advised that the majority of arbitra-
tion agreements tend to provide for arbitration "under the law of'
Maryland, section 3-202 was amended to reflect this situation.
Secondly, former article 7, section 18, providing for appeals from
certain orders in arbitration cases, is not included in subtitle 3
because of revisions made in title 12.
Subtitle 3 restates with stylistic changes the present law
dealing with judgments and attachments on original process.9
Certain omissions from the subtitle, however, should be noted.
Former sections 31 and 32 of article 9 of the 1957 Code, covering
wage attachments, will be included in the Commercial Law Arti-
cle, scheduled for presentation to the 1975 General Assembly.
Furthermore, section 49 of article 9, providing for certain liens in
favor of the State, will probably be placed in the proposed Real
Property Article.
Subtitle 4 embodies the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act. 2 The insertion of section 3-403, which asserts that the Dis-
trict Court lacks declaratory judgment power, was necessary
since former article 31A, section 1 gave authority to issue declara-
tory judgments to "[c]ourts of record within their respective
jurisdictions . . . . I' Although the District Court is a court of
87. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 26 (July
16, 1973).
88. Section 3-230 of the Courts Article is derived from article 75, section 18.
89. Venue provisions are included in section 3-203 of subtitle 2, rather than in title
6 of the Courts Article, because they are somewhat unusual and because of convenience
in placing them with the other provisions of the Uniform Act.
90. Amendment No. 20.
91. The venue provisions of former article 9, section 36 of the 1957 Code appear in
title 6 of the Courts Article.
92. Md. Ann. Code art. 31A (1971).
93. Md. Ann. Code art. 31A, § 1 (1971).
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record,'" it was generally agreed that the legislature had not in-
tended to grant the power to issue declaratory judgments to the
District Court. Hence, section 3-403 was drafted to reflect this
agreement.
Section 3-404, also a clarifying provision, is intended to limit
the right of jury trial in declaratory judgment proceedings to
appropriate actions at law. Former article 31A, section 9 appar-
ently permitted a jury determination of any issue of fact in a
declaratory judgment case, including an equity suit. This provi-
sion may have been appropriate in 1939, when advisory jury ver-
dicts in equity were permitted. 5 However, since Maryland Rule
517 abolishes advisory jury verdicts in equity, the provision
seemed inconsistent with modem equity practice.
Although clarification and consistency were the bases for the
enactment of the previous sections, section 3-502 within subtitle
5 covering defamation may engender a violation of article 46 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.96 Section 3-502 (a), based on
former article 88, permits a woman to recover for defamatory
remarks about her chastity without proving actual damages. A
husband is also permitted to maintain an action against a person
who has thus slandered his wife under the provisions of section
3-502(b). However, a man may not reap the benefits of section 3-
502(a), and a wife may not maintain an action of slander under
section 3-502(b). Because of the possible conflict with article 46
of the Declaration of Rights, the Commission suggested that the
General Assembly might wish to extend these protections "to all
persons regardless of sex." 97 However, the legislature did not ac-
cept the invitation.
Subtitle 6 of the title 3 was designated as "Family Law" to
indicate its relationship to the eventual revised article which will
bear the same name and which will include most of the substan-
tive statutes in the domestic relations and similar areas." The
subtitle is limited to jurisdictional provisions pertaining to adop-
tion, child custody, guardianship, maintenance, divorce, and
94. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1972).
95. The Declaratory Judgments Act was enacted by chapter 294, Laws of 1939. See
ch. 294, [19391 Md. Laws 656.
96. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."
MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 46 (Supp. 1973).
97. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 29 (July
16, 1973).
98. This article is tentatively scheduled for enactment in 1976. See Code Revision
Commission, Revisor's Manual, Appendix B (2d ed. Nov. 1973).
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annulment, including disposition of personal property incident to
a divorce."
Subtitle 7, which includes various provisions of article 42 of
the 1957 Code dealing with habeas corpus, °0 appears in title 3
because habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and because the writ
may be sought for unlawful confinements unrelated to criminal
matters. One change, however, that should be noted is reflected
in section 3-707, which corrects an error appearing in former sec-
tion 20 of article 42. That section in part provided: "The applica-
tion [for leave to appeal] shall include a transcript of any pro-
ceedings conducted incident to the habeas corpus petition unless
the application . . . is granted, in which event the court may
order the preparation of a transcript . . . ." In Bigley v.
Warden,'' the Court of Special Appeals noted that the word
"not" should be inserted between "shall" and "include" in the
first part of the sentence. Section 3-707(d) (3) now reflects the
correct language.
Subtitle 8 is the longest and most complex portion of title 3
because it deals with one of our most complex statutory
areas-juvenile causes, other than juvenile causes in Montgo-
mery County. Since the District Court has juvenile jurisdiction
in that county,'"2 those statutes appear in title 4 of the Courts
Article. This fact in itself was organizationally troublesome. Ob-
viously, the provisions of former article 26, sections 51, 67, 67-70,
70-1 through 70-26, 71, and 71A dealing with juvenile causes were
intended to serve the same ends as former article 26, sections 72-
88 dealing with juvenile causes in Montgomery County. Further-
more, many of the procedural details of these two subtitles of
former article 26 were similar, if not identical. Because of these
similarities, the staffs first reaction was to attempt to merge the
99. The subtitle is derived from former article 16, sections, 2, 22, 24, 29, 66(a) and
68 of the Code. Venue provisions generally appear in title 6 of the Courts Article. See note
143 et seq. infra and accompanying text.
100. Former section 21 of article 42 has been repealed as obsolete. Sections 11 and
12 of article 42 have been transferred to title 2 of the Courts Article, while sections 13 and
18 of former article 42 have been transferred to article 27 because they relate exclusively
to criminal law and only marginally to habeas corpus. Ch. 2, §§ 3, 9, [1973 Extraordinary
Sess.] Md. Laws at 392 and 405, respectively.
Thus, only section 23 through section 28 remain in article 42. These constitute the
Uniform Act for Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind, which has no connection with
habeas corpus. Eventually, this Act should probably be allocated with other provisions
relating to extradition (see MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 16 et seq. (1971, Supp. 1973)) or
perhaps with those pertaining to mental health. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59 (1972, Supp.
1973).
101. 16 Md. App. 1, 294 A.2d 141 (1972).
102. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 4-403 (1974).
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two sets of provisions. 03 However, there were too many diverse
provisions to make this feasible,'"4 and the full Commission de-
cided on the present arrangement.'"5
Structurally, this is logically defensible. Unfortunately, the
decision in effect meant that the two sets of juvenile provisions
were drafted by different people at different times and were also
considered by the Subcommittee and the Commission at differ-
ent times. These facts tended to produce the undesirable side
effect of the use of somewhat dissimilar phraseology to express
very similar concepts. For example, section 3-833 of the Courts
Article provides: "No adjudication of the status of a child under
this subtitle is a criminal conviction for any purpose nor does it
impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by a crimi-
nal conviction."'" 6 The comparable Montgomery County provi-
sion, section 4-520(a), reads: "Adjudication of the status of a
child under this subtitle is not a criminal conviction for any pur-
pose nor does it impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily
imposed by a criminal conviction."'' 07 There is no reason why one
of these provisions should have been cast in the negative and the
other in the positive, when each is stating precisely the same
concept.
Because similar inconsistencies can be found in other juve-
nile causes sections,'08 this material needs further attention.' 9 In
terms of code revision, although Emerson teaches us that a "fool-
ish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,""' he condemns
only "foolish" consistency. Consistency in bill drafting is not fool-
ish, but highly desirable, and I am inclined to agree with one of
the Commission members that "a Commission such as ours
103. Staff Memorandum No. 1 to Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings, Exhibit B (June 16, 1971).
104. Staff Report No. 18 at 4 (Oct. 16, 1972).
105. Commission Minutes 3 (Oct. 23, 1972).
106. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-833 (1974).
107. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 4-520(a) (1974).
108. Other examples of inconsistency are found in sections 3-834 and 4-520(c); sec-
tions 3-838 and 4-521; and sections 3-839 and 4-518 of the Courts Article.
109. At one time the Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceedings gave some
thought to placing all of this material in the proposed article on Family Law. Subcommit-
tee Minutes 8 (July 29, 1971). However, the idea was rejected, possibly on the basis that
this sort of material (especially quasi-criminal material like that dealing with delin-
quency) really is not germane to such typical Family Law subjects as divorce, custody,
adoption, and support. Nevertheless, a further study of the subject should not be pre-
cluded, particularly if Maryland moves towards establishment of a family court which
would have juvenile jurisdiction.
110. R. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 43, 53 (1885).
MARYLAND CODE REVISION
should not tolerate inconsistent drafting.""'
Turning to other aspects of subtitle 8, the reader will observe
the application of code guidelines. Material in this subtitle is
rearranged in a logical fashion, and lengthy sections are broken
into subsections or even separate sections."' To facilitate the lo-
cation of any given word or phrase, the definitions in section 3-
801 are placed in alphabetical order. The definition of "property"
for the purpose of section 3-839, entitled liability for acts of child,
is also broadened to comply with assumed legislative intent."3
Finally, provisions relating to concurrent guardianship and pa-
ternity jurisdiction are clarified to make it plain that a juvenile
court may exercise these species of jurisdiction only in a case
otherwise within its jurisdiction."'
The most noteworthy features of subtitle 8 probably relate to
omissions of certain material. Two of these omissions are the
result of errors in the preparation of the Courts Article. Former
article 26, section 70-2(d), embodied in section 3-808 of the Courts
Article, was amended by chapters 129 and 772, Acts of 1973.
Chapter 129 added "unauthorized use of occupancy of a boat" to
the offenses retained within juvenile jurisdiction. Although this
provision was inserted in a draft of the Courts Article and chapter
129 was mentioned in the Revisor's Notes, the new language was
omitted from paragraph (3) of section 3-808 apparently through
a combination of terminal operator and proofreading problems
plus inadequate communication between draftsmen and editors.
In a similar fashion, a reference to the offense of tampering with
111. Letter from Commissioner Shale D. Stiller to the author (July 23, 1973).
Indeed, recent developments suggest that much more than inconsistent drafting is
involved in the differences between the Montgomery County juvenile provisions and those
applicable to the rest of the State. In Matter of Trader and State v. Trader, 20 Md. App.
1, 315 A.2d 528 (1974), cert. granted, - Md. -, A.2d - (Apr. 17, 1974), the
Court of Special Appeals held section 3-817 of the Courts Article unconstitutional on equal
protection and due process grounds, because under that section a juvenile waiver order is
interlocutory and not appealable, whereas in Montgomery County such an order is final
and immediately appealable. Similarly, section 3-808(4) of the Courts Article has been
held unconstitutional because it excludes from juvenile jurisdiction any charge of armed
robbery allegedly committed by a person 16 years old or older, whereas such charges are
within juvenile jurisdiction in Montgomery County. State v. Stokes, Indictment No. 3
(7303976-78, Crim. Court of Baltimore City 4/2/74) (Liss, J.). S.B. 1099 [1974], intro-
duced near the end of the 1974 legislative session, attempted to solve the equal protection
problem by repealing most of the Montgomery County juvenile provisions. It did not pass.
The 1974 Legislative Council has referred the problem to the Judiciary Committee.
112. See, e.g., former article 26, section 70-2 (Supp. 1973), the provisions of which
now appear in some seven different sections to facilitate comprehension and future
amendment.
113. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-801(C) (1974).
114. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., §§ 3-806 to -807 (1974i.
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a boat was omitted from section 3-815(b)" 5
An additional omission or deletion from subtitle 8 is the re-
sult of a deliberate policy choice. In studying the juvenile causes
subtitle of former article 26, the Commission observed that sec-
tion 70-2(a)(7) gave juvenile jurisdiction over an adult charged
with causing a child to be adjudicated "neglected, delinquent, or
in need of supervision" only if adjudication with respect to the
status of the child had been completed. On the other hand, the
Commission interpreted former article 26, section 91, under the
subtitle Minors Without Proper Care or Guardianship, as permit-
ting proceedings against an adult prior to a judicial determina-
tion that a child was "without proper care or guardianship." Be-
cause of the apparent inconsistency between the two sections, the
Commission decided to propose the full repeal of most of the
"Minors Without Proper Care or Guardianship" subtitle, and to
eliminate the precondition of adjudication of the juvenile with
respect to charges of "contributing" against an adult;"' the latter
decision was reflected in section 3-805(a) of the Courts Article.
However, when this approach was presented to the Senate Judi-
cial Proceedings and House Judiciary Committees at the special
session, the committee members promptly decided that the pro-
posal involved fundamental policy considerations, and thus
should not be included in a revision bill. Consequently, section
3-805 was amended to restore the present language regarding
prior adjudication," 7 although the elimination of most of the
"Minors Without Proper Care or Guardianship" material was
approved." '
Contrasted to subtitle 8 is subtitle 9, entitled Wrongful
Death, which involves only style and arrangement changes in its
incorporation of former article 67 of the 1957 Code-Maryland's
Lord Campbell's Act. Although the Commission did give consid-
eration to codifying the "pecuniary loss" rule as enunciated in
Hutzell v. Boyer,"' it decided that codification might result in
advertent modification of the rule and that any such change
should be left to the General Assembly. 20 Also rejected was a
115. See Md. Ann. Code, art. 26, § 70-3 (1973).
116. Commission Minutes 6-7 (May 23, 1973). See also Staff Report No. 37 (May
21, 1973).
117. Amendment No. 34.
118. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., §§ 3-841 and 3-842 (1974) are the
retained portions of the former subtitle.
119. 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969). See also ch. 352, [1969] Md. Laws 811.
120. See Subcommittee Minutes (Mar. 26, 1973).
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proposal to extend the provisions of section 3-904(d) 'I' to a parent
other than a "spouse. 122
TITLE 4: DISTRICT COURT-JURISDICTION
Title 4, the basis of which is former article 26, especially
section 145, contains within its purview provision for criminal
jurisdiction in subtitle 3.123 Although, as previously mentioned,
criminal matters are usually excluded from the Courts Article,
the inclusion of criminal jurisdiction was dictated by the conveni-
ence of retaining all District Court jurisdictional statutes in one
place as well as the difficulty of re-allocation of former article 26,
section 145(b).' 24
Subtitle 3 begins with a statement of the District Court's
exclusive original jurisdiction in criminal cases in section 4-301,
then lists exceptions to that jurisdiction in section 4-302. Ac-
tually, some of the "exceptions" might be more accurately char-
acterized as "conditions," but the meaning of the five sections,
taken together, is clear enough. Section 4-303 is a new statutory
provision, codifying an Attorney General's opinion,' 25 intended to
make it clear that if a juvenile court waives jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense within the general criminal juris-
diction of the District Court, then the District Court may hear the
criminal case, despite the normal 18 year old age minimum pre-
scribed by section 4-301.
Although provision for the District Court's criminal jurisdic-
tion is thereby incorporated within subtitle 3, those familiar with
criminal practice in the District Court will note that subtitle 3,
and the Courts Article in general, omits a number of provisions
121. (d) Damages if spouse of minor child dies. - For the death of a spouse or
minor child, the damages awarded under subsection (c) are not limited or re-
stricted by the "pecuniary loss" or "pecuniary benefit" rule but may include dam-
ages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companion-
ship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice,
counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable.
MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-904(d) (1974).
122. See Subcommittee Minutes (Mar. 26, 1973).
123. "Criminal cases" within the jurisdiction of the District Court now includes
motor vehicle violations by virtue of section 4-101(c). Thus, a degree of repetition has been
avoided by the consolidation of statutes dealing with criminal and motor vehicle jurisdic-
tion. This combination was possible because present motor vehicle violations are, in fact,
criminal offenses and subject to the usual rules relating to jury trials and criminal proce-
dure and due process in general.
124. This difficulty was the result of the fact that there is no provision in the 1957
Code containing general grants of criminal jurisdiction.
125. 57 Op. ATr'y GEN. 141 (1972). This opinion is incorrectly cited in the Revisor's
note for section 4-303.
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of former article 26 dealing with criminal venue, bail, warrants,
sentencing powers of judges, and the like. 2 These criminal venue
and procedure statutes have been transferred to article 27 and
placed with similar statutes pertaining to other courts.' These
transfers serve both to remove criminal material from the Courts
Article and to pave the way for the preparation of a revised Crimi-
nal Law Article. 28
The last two subtitles of title 4 include very few substantive
changes. Subtitle 4, structured along the lines of subtitle 3, in-
cludes the prohibition against declaratory judgment jurisdiction
in section 4-402(c), 2 1 which is the only new statutory material in
this subtitle. Subtitle 5, which parallels subtitle 8 of title 3, sets
forth detailed material pertaining to juvenile charges in Montgo-
mery County.
One final noteworthy feature of title 4 is the absence of provi-
sions providing for an automatic right of removal in the District
Court, formerly contained in article 26, section 145(f). The omis-
sion of these provisions was dictated by the subsequent adoption
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland of District Rules 542 and
738 which provided for discretionary transfers of causes in the
District Court; because the rules superseded the statute under
article IV, section 18 of the Constitution,1 3" the Commission in-
cluded in the Courts Bill a repeal of article 26, section 145(f).' 3'
TITLE 5: LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITED ACTIONS
Title 5 contains three subtitles, dealing with limitations,
computation of time, and prohibited actions, respectively. Based
chiefly on article 57 of the 1957 Code, the title does not cover
certain "notice" statutes (requiring notice as a condition preced-
ent to filing suit) or statutes in which the "limitation" provision
126. Omitted are sections 145(b) (5) (i), 145 (b) (6), 145 (b) (7), 145(b) (10), 146,
and 159 of former article 26.
127. Ch. 2, §§ 3 and 6-10, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws at 392 and 397,
respectively.
128. Additional provisions have been repealed because they are adequately dealt
with elsewhere. This list includes: Md. Ann. Code art, 26, § 145 (b)(8) (1973) - covered
by article 27A, section 6(f) as amended by section 6 of the Courts Bill; Md. Ann. Code
art. 26, § 145(b) (9) (Supp. 1973)-covered by article 59, section 23, article 2C and article
43B; Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 147 (1973) - covered by MD. R.P. 764.
129. See note 93 et seq. supra and accompanying text.
130. See 56 Op. AT'y GEN. 91 (1971). In 1972, two bills, S.B. 531 and H.B. 246, were
introduced for the purpose of reinstating the statute and superseding the rules. However,
neither was enacted into law.
131. The repeal of article 26, section 145(f) was accomplished by ch. 2, [1973 Ex-
traordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 4.
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is in fact a condition precedent to the right of action. 3 ' Also
unaffected are sections 15, 17 and 18 of article 57, which deal with
pre-suit notice to certain political subdivisions; these provisions
will eventually be incorporated in the Local Government Article.
Subtitle 1, entitled Limitations, contains a few minor sub-
stantive changes. In contrast to the former section 1 of article 57,
which applied a three-year period of limitation to certain speci-
fied actions, section 5-101 applies a blanket three-year provision
to all civil actions at law in the absence of a specific statutory
provision to the contrary. Similarly, for the sake of consistency,
all officers' bonds rather than only those of sheriffs and constables
have been excluded from the twelve-year limitation provision of
section 5-102.11 Likewise, the provisions of former section 6 of
article 57, applicable only to sheriffs', constables', and coroners'
bonds, have been extended to all officers' bonds by section 5-104.
Finally, the portion of old section 12 of article 57, establishing a
one-month period of limitations for instituting a prosecution for
blasphemy, has been dropped, since the statute establishing the
crime of blasphemy was held unconstitutional in State v. West.'34
Subtitle 2 contains factors to be considered in computing the
times prescribed by subtitle 1. Here again, a substantive change
is found. Former sections 2, 3, 3A, 4, 6 and 7 of article 57 in effect
provided that if a plaintiff was under the disability when his
cause of action accrued, and the disability was later removed, he
could thereafter have brought suit within either the period pro-
vided by the applicable statute of limitations, if less than five
years, or half that period, if longer than five years. Section 5-201
requires suit to be brought within the lesser of three years or the
applicable period of limitations, after removal of the disabilities.
This provision promotes uniformity and reduces the possibility of
undue delay in bringing suit, particularly in land actions. How-
ever, the new rule will apply only to a cause of action accruing
on or after January 1, 1974.1 5
Although a substantive change can be found in section 5-201
of fhe Courts Article, section 5-205 reinstates the substance of
sections 4 and 5 of article 57. These sections denied the benefit
of limitations to certain persons leaving the State, moving from
132. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-904 (1974) and other
provisions such as MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 64 (1971); art. 45, § 1 (1971); art. 47, § 23
(1971); art. 93, § 8-103 (Supp. 1972); art. 100 § 55D (Supp. 1973); and art. 101 § 58
(Supp. 1973).
133. Compare this provision with Md. Ann. Code, art. 57, § 3 (1972).
134. 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (1970).
135. Ch. 2, § 21, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 431.
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county to county, or absent from the State when the cause of
action accrued. While the Commission thought that modern
venue provisions and the long-arm statute rendered these stat-
utes largely obsolete, '1 6 the General Assembly saw the matter
otherwise, and section 5-201 reflects the retention of these stat-
utes. "7
Subtitle 3 concerns prohibited actions, and, aside from some
miscellaneous provisions, 3' the subtitle is based on article 75C.
The Commission defined a prohibited action as one barred be-
cause a statute provides that certain facts are not actionable, as
distinguished from a limitation, which deals with the time for
bringing a suit, assuming actionable facts.'3 1
One provision of subtitle 3 which produced some debate with
respect to its prohibition of actions for breach of promise to marry
was section 5-301. The former statute 40 permitted this action if
''pregnancy exists . . . . The Commission staff contended that
article 46 of the Declaration of Rights required this language to
be construed to give a right of action to either the jilted man or
the jilted woman, if the woman were pregnant. 4' The Commis-
sion thought, however, that the legislative intent was to limit the
right of action to a pregnant woman, and that any Constitutional
problem should be resolved by the General Assembly. 4 ' Section
5-301 reflects that view.
TITLE 6: PERSONAL JURISDICTION, VENUE, PROCESS AND
PRACTICE
As its name indicates, title 6, composed of four subtitles, is
something of mixed bag, deriving mostly from article 75 of the
1957 Code. However, it draws important material from article 96
as well. As will be seen, there are numerous close relationships
between title 6 and the Maryland Rules and Maryland District
Rules, and in several instances what was once statutory material
has been left to rules treatment.
Section 6-101, although largely cast in the form of a defini-
tion, includes a number of concepts derived from article 96. Arti-
136. See Staff Report No. 21 at 9 (Nov. 17, 1972); Subcommittee Minutes 5 (Nov.
13, 1972).
137. Amendment No. 57.
138. See former Md. Ann. Code art. 16A, § 37 (1973); art. 23A. § 1A (Supp. 1973);
art. 25, § 1A (Supp. 1973); art. 25A § 3A (Supp. 1973); art. 25B, § 10A (Supp. 1973).
139. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 44 (July
16, 1973).
140. Md. Ann. Code art. 75C, § 2 (1969).
141. Staff Report No. 21 at 7-8 (Nov. 17, 1972).
142. See Commission Minutes 26 (May 6-7, 1973).
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cle 96, designated "United States," contains a hodge-podge of
provisions dealing with certain relationships between Maryland
and the United States. Many of these provisions merely consent
to the acquisition of land by the United States.' Others are
phrased as retentions of jurisdiction over acts occurring on spe-
cific federal lands or in terms of the power of the State to serve
process on those lands.' Still others are blanket provisions cover-
ing all federal land and retaining jurisdiction to the fullest extent
consistent with federal law and the Constitution.'45
Because of the varied nature of article 96, no attempt was
made to revise or repeal any part of it. Instead, parts of it were
duplicated in section 1-601, which also incorporates some con-
cepts found in sections 23 and 69 of article 16. Basically, section
6-101 defines "State" and "County" as including federal enclaves
and makes it clear that for purposes of personal jurisdiction,
venue, and service of process, "resident" includes one residing on
a federal enclave. Subsection (d) of section 6-101 restates the
general policy of extending State jurisdiction over persons to
those on federal lands, to the maximum permissible extent.
Of the remaining portions of subtitle 1, the most significant
is section 6-103, the Maryland Long Arm statute. Paragraph (1)
of subsection (b) slightly expands the language of former article
75, section 96, by adding the phrase "or performs any character
of work or service in the State." However, in view of the stated
legislative intent in adopting the Long Arm statute, this is not
thought of as a change of substance.'46
Subtitle 2 is concerned with venue. Its drafting presented
real difficulties, and the venue provisions still appear to be un-
duly complex.'47 There is little that can be done about this, absent
major legislative review of the entire venue area. Such a review
should address, among other things, the desirability of venue
distinctions based on the corporate or individual status of the
defendant, and whether there is continuing need for the distinc-
tion between transitory and local actions. 4 '
143. Md. Ann. Code art. 96, § 35 (1964) is typical. It permits the United States to
erect "a bridge across Spesutie Narrows to connect Spesutie Island with Maryland in
Harford County .. "
144. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 96, § 29 (1964) relating to jurisdiction over and
service of process on a rifle range in Anne Arundel County.
145. Md. Ann. Code art. 96, § 47 (1964) is an example.
146. See Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812 (1966).
147. Various efforts were made to draft these provisions according to classes of
action, classes of defendants, and so on. The present provisions were approved at the
Commission meeting held on May 6-7, 1973. Commission Minutes 28 (May 6-7, 1973).
148. Although venue seems essentially a procedural matter, the Court of Appeals
1974
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In any event, the major changes in subtitle 2 are structural.
Section 6-201 states the general rule, both for individual and
multiple defendants. It applies to both corporate and non-
corporate defendants. 49 The fundamental policy of the former
law in laying venue where the defendant lives or works is essen-
tially continued.
Section 6-202 incorporates former statutory provisions for
additional venues in certain types of cases. 5' It also draws upon
Maryland Rules 570 and BQ 4Q and 53. 5 It should be noted that
this provision is intended to permit the plaintiff to choose either
a venue permitted by section 6-201 or one permitted by section
6-202. That is, the sections are cumulative and not mutually
exclusive.'
Section 6-203 provides venues for actions to which the gen-
eral rule of section 6-201 does not apply. If an action is listed in
section 6-203, the venue provided in that section governs, unless
section 6-202 provides an alternate venue for the same action, in
which event, the plaintiff may choose between section 6-202 and
section 6-203. Thus, it is probable that subtitle 2 reflects a modest
liberalization of venue provisions. With our increasingly mobile
population and extensive use of the automobile, no real inconve-
nience to defendants should accrue.
Subtitle 3 pertains to service of process. The Commission's
underlying philosophy here was to leave such matters to rule
when possible. Other provisions relating to the mechanics of
process-serving are found in subtitle 3 of title 2 of the Courts
Article.
Worthy of comment here, however, is the Commission's con-
has tended not to deal with it under its rule-making power. Only a few rules, such as S70,
T41, and BQ40 include venue provisions. This may well be because there are many
sensitive public policy considerations involved in venue, and under most circumstances,
they may be especially appropriate for legislative resolution.
149. This section synthesizes Md. Ann. Code art. 75, § 75(a) (Supp. 1973), § 75(b)
(1969), and § 75A(a) (1969). See also Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954);
Md. Ann. Code art. 16, §§ 100, 101 (1973) and art. 50, § 5 (1972). A number of statutory
venue provisions are not included, mainly because they seemed especially closely related
to certain provisions of substantive law, and thus more conveniently codified with the
appropriate substantive law. Some of these are sections 3-203 and 3-818 of the Courts
Article (Arbitration and Award, and Juvenile Causes); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 108
(Abatement of Nuisances) (1971); art. 47, § 1 (Insolvents) (1971); art. 78A, § 91 (Public
Service Companies) (1969); and art. 93A, § 202 (Minors) (1969).
150. These statutory sources range from article 9 through articles 16, 26, 75 and 90
of the 1957 Code.
151. Paragraph (11) of section 6-202 also codifies case-law. See Alcarese v. Stinger,
197 Md. 236, 78 A.2d 651 (1951).
152. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 47 (July
16, 1973).
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cern with several statutory provisions providing for fictional ap-
pointment of various State officials for the purpose of service of
process. Typical of these provisions are former article 661/2, sec-
tion 9-301, and former article 75, sections 76, 77, and 78. All
enacted prior to the Long Arm Statute, these laws called for
service on the Secretary of State, but also required some sort of
actual notice to the defendant, in accordance with Constitutional
notions of due process including actual notice of suit and oppor-
tunity to be heard. 13 Because both the Constitution and the stat-
utes required some sort of actual notice to the defendant, the
provisions for service on a State official had really become redun-
dant. 151
Initially, the Commission staff included these statutes in the
drafts.' 5 The Courts Subcommittee, however, favored elimina-
tion of these provisions, which was certainly a step towards clari-
fication and simplification of the law. The Subcommittee sup-
ported the concept of leaving service on non-residents to Mary-
land Rule 107, with some sort of back-up provision for service on
the Secretary of State.' 8 Pursuant to the subcommittee's instruc-
tions, the staff checked with the State agencies authorized to be
served with process. The concept of a single State agency to serve
this function drew what the staff described as a "luke-warm"
response.5 7 At the Commission meeting on May 6-7, 1973, Com-
missioner Stiller argued forcefully that all statutory provisions for
service on State officials in connection with non-resident defen-
dants should be abolished; he was supported by Commissioners
Sykes and Powers. However, Chairman James thought that too
much substantive change might be involved, and in this he was
supported by the representative of the Attorney General's Off-
ice. 158
Eventually, Commissioner Sykes proposed that provisions
for service on the Secretary of State should be repealed, but that
statutes dealing with service on the Insurance Commissioner, the
Blue-Sky Commissioner, and other officials exercising some regu-
153. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and the
more recent statement of similar constitutional concepts (not including non-residents) in
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1973).
154. This situation was emphasized by the adoption in 1966 of Maryland Rule 107
providing for service of process outside the State. See MD. R. P. 107.
155. See Staff Memorandum No. 15 to Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings 5 (Feb. 23, 1973).
156. Subcommittee Minutes 7 (Apr. 12, 1973).
157. Staff Report No. 32 at 4 (Apr. 30, 1973).
158. Commission Minutes 28-29 (May 6-7, 1973).
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latory functions should be retained. The alternatives of retention
of existing statutes as well as repeal of all statutes authorizing
service on State officials were also discussed, but the Sykes pro-
posal was eventually adopted.'59 Subtitle 3 of title 6 now reflects
this position, as well as the philosophy of leaving many process
matters to the rules. °6 Although this produced minor substantive
change, the alterations abolish archaic provisions and simplify
procedure. They are also consistent with Constitutional theory.
Subtitle 4, "Practice," gathers a miscellany of statutes which
could not readily be allocated elsewhere. Little comment is re-
quired, except to note that in connection with section 6-401, the
Commission concluded that, while abatement of an action was
procedural,'"' survival was a substantive matter and should be
included in the Code.' 62 The Commission also proposed a substan-
tive change in article 75, section 22 of the 1957 Code. As it for-
merly existed, this section required approval of certain torts set-
tlements by the Orphans' Courts, although article 93A, sections
401 and 408 provide for supervision by a circuit court of a tort
recovery for the benefit of a minor in excess of $2,000. Section 6-
405 of the courts article now gives the court in which suit is
pending, not the Orphans' Court, the power to approve settle-
ments. The Commission believed this would simplify procedures
and reduce duplication of effort, since the law court would have
before it all details of the case and would make an informed
judgment of the fairness of the proposed settlement even more
effectively than could an Orphans' Court hearing the matter.'63
TITLE 7: COSTS
Consolidation is the major task performed in title 7, since it
brings together numerous statutes dealing with court costs.' 4 The
four subtitles of title 7 relate to costs in the appellate courts, costs
159. Id. at 29-30.
160. Surviving statutes (outside the Courts Article) dealing with service on officials
include MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 38 (Securities Commissioner) (1971); art. 48A, §§ 57,
205, & 347 (Insurance Commissioner) (1972); and art. 56, § 219 (Real Estate Commission)
(1972).
161. See MD. R. P. 220.
162. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 50 (July
16, 1973).
163. Id. at 50-51. The provisions of article 93A will appear as sections 13-401 through
13-407 of the Estates and Trusts Article. Ch. 11, [1974] Md. Laws 17.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act was originally drafted as subtitle
5 of title 6, but the Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Proceedings decided not to
include this material in the Courts Article. Subcommittee Minutes 10 (Apr. 12, 1973).
164. Md. Ann. Code art. 24 (1973); 36 (1971); 5 (1968); 17 (1973); and 26 (1973).
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in the circuit courts, costs in the District Court, and miscella-
neous costs.
A minor substantive change appears in section 7-103(c), per-
taining to petitions for certiorari filed by indigents. The new pro-
vision requires the court in which the petition is filed to make the
determination of indigency. Under the old law,'65 this determina-
tion was made by the lower court; thus, action was required by
two courts in every case of this type. The Commission thought the
court receiving the petition could consider both the affidavit of
indigency and the petition.'6 The statute is also clarified by pro-
viding for payment by the State, if indigency is found, regardless
of whether the petition is granted or rejected. 7
Two problems are presented by title 7, both probably requir-
ing corrective action. Section 7-201 is based on former article 36,
section 12(a), as amended by chapter 532, Acts of 1973. That
section dealt with mandatory advance filing fees. Paragraph (2)
of that section was, however, badly garbled in the 1973 regular
session. This created ambiguity about whether the paragraph was
intended to exempt from the advance filing fees only appeals
from the Workmen's Compensation Commission or appeals from
all administrative agencies, as well as civil appeals from the Dis-
trict Court. The Commission adopted the "all administrative
appeals" approach on the basis of Glanville v. David Hairstylist'65
but this interpretation may not have been the correct reading of
the legislative intent.6 9
In addition, the Commission omitted from title 7 the lan-
guage of article 36, section 12(d) (2) of the 1957 Code. This para-
graph exempts political subdivisions from charges for "the serv-
ices enumerated herein." The Commission apparently thought
that "herein" referred to paragraph (1) of subsection (d), which
lists certain non-court related activities of clerks. A closer reading
of old section 12 suggests, however, that "herein" may refer to all
of the section except the advance filing fee provision. That was
the construction suggested by the Court of Appeals in Baltimore
165. Md. Ann. Code art. 5, §§ 15, 15A and 15B (1968).
166. See Commission Minutes 3 (May 23, 1973).
167. Another minor substantive change is the addition of section 7-204(b)(3), per-
mitting Baltimore City Court employees to use the Bar Library. Amendment No. 64,
adopted by the Senate.
168. 249 Md. 162, 238 A.2d 917 (1967). See Code Revision Commission, Report No.
3F to the General Assembly, at 53-54.
169. In point of fact, the 1974 General Assembly enacted H.B. 466, which exempted
from advance filing fees (in addition to indigent cases) only appeals from the Workmen's
Compensation Commission and certain appeals in unemployment compensation cases.
Ch. 444 [1974] Md. Laws 1693.
1974
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
v. Clerk of Supreme Bench. 7o The 1974 General Assembly appar-
ently agreed with this view, since by chapter 684, Acts of 1974, it
repealed and re-enacted section 7-202 of the Courts Article add-
ing, among other things, a new subsection (c) reading: "The Clerk
may not charge any county or Baltimore City any fee provided
by this Subtitle, unless the county and Baltimore City first gives
its consent." 7 '
However, the legislature may have broadened the exemption
considerably. The old exemption, as construed in Baltimore v.
Clerk of Supreme Bench,'72 did not extend to the advance filing
fee prescribed by section 7-202(a) of the Courts Article. The new
exemption extends to "any fee provided by this Subtitle" (em-
phasis supplied) and this would seem to apply to the advance
filing fee as well.
It has been suggested in some quarters that enactment of the
Courts Article also had the effect of subjecting the State of Mary-
land and its agencies to the payment of court costs, including
advance filing fees. It is difficult to follow this argument, because
case law after 1832 has held that neither the State nor a State
agency may be charged with court costs, in the absence of an
express statutory provision.'73 While an express statutory provi-
sion permitting the award of costs against the State is found in
section 7-104,11 neither section 7-201 nor section 7-202 of the
Courts Article contains an express authorization for the award of
costs against the State, in the sense of specifically mentioning the
State as a party against which costs may be assessed.
On the other hand, neither does either of these sections ex-
pressly exempt the State.'7 5 Indeed, there does not seem to be any
general statutory exemption for the State. Rather, if there is an
exemption for the State, it exists by virtue of case law and has
neither been granted nor been taken away by the Courts Article.
TITLE 8: JURIES
To recapitulate briefly, we have traced the Courts Article
170. 270 Md. 316, 311 A. 2d 261 (1973), construing statutes as they existed before
article 36 was amended. Md. Ann. Code art. 24, §§ 10, 11 and 12, repealed by ch. 532
[19731 Md. Laws 1159.
171. Ch. 684 [1974] Md. Laws 2306.
172. 270 Md. 316, 311 A.2d 261 (1973).
173. State ex rel. President, Charlotte Hall School v. Greenwell, 4 G.&J. 407 (1832).
See also State Tax Commission v. Standard Oil Co., 181 Md. 637, 31 A.2d 621 (1943) and
State v. Williams, 101 Md. 529, 61 A. 297 (1905).
174. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 7-104 (1974). This section was for-
merly Md. Ann. Code, art. 5, § 23 (1968). See also Md. R. P. 882 and 1082.
175. Compare also M. R. P. 604.
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from the organization and structure of the courts and their offi-
cers (titles 1 and 2) through subject matter jurisdiction, (titles 3
and 4), limitations (title 5), personal jurisdiction, venue and pro-
cess (title 6), and court costs (title 7). In short, we have gotten
the potential litigant into court; the trial is about to begin, and
the next step is jury selection and other jury-related matters.
These are the contents of title 8.176
In 1967 and 1968, the Committee on Judicial Administration
of the Maryland State Bar Association engaged in a study of jury
selection procedure in Maryland.'" In 1969, the Section of Judi-
cial Administration, through a distinguished committee headed
by former United States Senator Joseph D. Tydings, presented a
state-wide jury selection bill which was approved by the Associa-
tion.' 8 This became chapter 408, Acts of 1969, which comprised
most of article 51 of the 1957 Code. Chapter 408 has been trans-
ferred to the Courts Article virtually without change, except for
differences in structure and minor changes in language. Struc-
tural changes are reflected in the organization of title 8. The first
of the four subtitles includes general provisions, such as defini-
tions, policy statements, and a section on juror compensation.' 9
Subtitle 2 includes selection provisions common to all juries, both
grand and petit. Subtitle 3 contains provisions applicable only to
petit juries. Subtitle 4 gathers penalty provisions.
Two particularly interesting code revision problems are illu-
minated by title 8. The first is the problem of public local laws.
Still on the statute books are numerous public local laws dealing
with jury selection. Even prior to the 1969 overhaul of former
article 51, article 51 and the public local laws were in frequent
conflict. Indeed, in some of the local laws, the statutory cross-
references still refer to provisions of the Code of 1888.11s0 The area
of juror compensation shows good examples of this. For instance,
176. It should be noted that detailed provisions concerning grand juries are not
included in the Courts Article, other than provisions common to both grand and petit
juries, because the grand jury material was deemed to be more related to criminal law.
Thus, former article 51, section 20, dealing with powers of grand juries, was transferred
to article 27 by ch. 841, [1973] Md. Laws 4926.
177. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N TRANSCRIPT No. 1 at 24, 25 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
MSBA TRANS.].
178. 74 MSBA TRANs. No. 1 at 46, 48-67 (1969).
179. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 9-106 (1974). The Commission was
disturbed by the substantial non-uniformity of these provisions but believed that local
policy was involved and that the Commission should not attempt to achieve uniformity
in this area.
180. See Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 60
(July 16, 1973).
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the public local laws applicable to Garrett County provide that
jurors receive $3.50 per day compensation and 121/2 cents per mile
for travel."8 ' Former Article 51 provided $10 per day and 10 cents
per mile, as does the Courts Article. 8 ' Despite the statutory rule
that "[wihere the public general law and the public local law of
any county. . .are in conflict, the public local law shall pre-
vail", 3 the Garrett County officials paid jurors as provided in
former Article 51.' 4
Although in Loker v. State' the Court of Appeals decided
that a previously adopted provision of public local law prevailed
over certain conflicting portions of former article 51, the 1969
rewriting of article 51 probably superseded all conflicting local
laws. '5 Nevertheless, the existence of conflicting provisions in the
statute books is confusing, and should be eliminated.
The problem extends well beyond the area of jury selection,
since numerous public local laws contain archaic and conflicting
provisions pertaining to matters covered by the Courts Article.
While the Code Revision Commission was not directed to revise
the public local laws,' 7 it did feel that the problem should be
brought to the attention of the county delegations in the General
Assembly. To this end, in September, 1973, each county delega-
tion was furnished a listing of local laws inconsistent with the
Courts Article.' 8 It is gratifying to note that some seventeen
counties have so far responded to this situation, in one form or
another. 9
181. GARRETT COUNTY, MD., CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS art. 12, § 20-1 (1971).
182. See Md. Ann. Code art. 51, § 19(h) (1972) and MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Art., § 8-106(b) (12) (1974).
183. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 13 (1968).
184. See Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 60
(July 16, 1973). This report lists all conflicting local jury provisions.
185. 2 Md. App. 1, 233 A.2d 342 (1967), afl'd, 250 Md. 677, 245 A.2d 814 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1082 (1969).
186. The purpose of chapter 408, Laws of 1969, was clearly to provide uniform, state-
wide jury selection procedures. When a public general law manifests a plain intent to
establish a state-wide policy, inconsistent public local laws must give way. See Kirkwood
v. Provident State Bank, 205 Md. 48, 106 A.2d 103 (1954). The legislative intent is made
patent by section 4, chapter 408, Laws of 1969, repealing "all other acts or parts of acts
including portions of the several codes of public local laws" to the extent inconsistent with
chapter 408. In charter counties, public general laws supersede inconsistent local laws in
any event. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3.
187. The Governor directed the Commission to "[riecommend solutions to the
problems of publishing . . . public local laws . Commission Minutes 1 (Sept. 18,
1970).
188. Report from legal intern Alan V. Cecil to director, Code Revision Commission
(Feb. 13, 1974).
189. Id. at 3. Some of the bills on this subject introduced [Results shown in brack-
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The second matter of special interest connected with title 8
has to do with British statutes. 9 " In the course of drafting title 8,
it was discovered that a number of British statutes at one time
and possibly still in effect in Maryland related to juries and jury
selection. These statutes are not always easy to locate, and many
lawyers and judges probably do not even attempt to locate them
in most cases.' Nevertheless, British statutes apparently in con-
flict with present law should be repealed to avoid possible confu-
sion, while those still viable should be properly codified so as to
be readily accessible to the Bench, Bar and public. A beginning
of this process was generated by work on title 8 and will continue
as code revision progresses.9 2
TITLE 9: WITNESSES
In the beginning of its work, the Code Revision Commission
staff visualized a single title dealing with witnesses and evi-
dence-essentially the subject-matter of former article 35 of the
Code.9 3 However, the subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings directed the use of two titles, one dealing with witnesses
and one with evidence.'94 Title 9 is concerned with basic questions
of competence, compellability, and privilege (subtitle 1); atten-
etsl at the 1974 Session of the General Assembly include: H.B. 100 (Calvert County)
[Failed]; H.B. 453 (Allegany County) [Failed]; H.B. 736 (Frederick County) [ch. 104
[19741 Md. Laws -1; H.B. 872 (Charles County) [ch. 107 [1974] Md. Laws 631];
H.B. 953 [Failed] & 1319 (Washington County) [ch. 797, [1974] Md. Laws]; H.B. 1210
[ch. 250 [1974] Md. Laws 913], 1213 [ch. 253 [1974] Md. Laws 918], & 1214 [ch. 254
[19741 Md. Laws 919] (Queen Anne's County); H.B. 1299 (Worcester County) [ch. 793,
[1974] Md. Laws]; H.B. 1339 (Carroll County) [ch. 537, [1974] Md. Laws 1847]; H.B.
1467 (Caroline County) [ch. 269 [1974] Md. Laws 939]; H.B. 1507 (Kent County) [ch.
816 [1974] Md. Laws 2733]; H.B. 1557 (Frederick County) [ch. 275 [1974] Md. Laws
948]; H.B. 1565 (Somerset County) [ch. 277 [1974] Md. Laws 953]; and S.B. 882 (Cecil
County) [Vetoed by Governor Mandel].
190. Under article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the citizens are "entitled
... to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July,
seventeen hundred and seventy-six; .... " MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 5.
191. The most readily available compilation is W.B. COE, ALEXANDER'S BRITISH
STATUTES (2d ed. 1912).
192. As a preliminary to the Courts Article, a number of British statutes were
abolished at the 1973 regular session of the General Assembly. These included 33 Edw. 1,
stat. 4 (1305); 5 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1513); 35 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1543); 4 & 5 Phil. & M., c. 7 (1557);
14 Eliz. 1, c. 9 (1572); and 6 & 7 W. & M., c. 4 (1694) - all declared inapplicable by
chapter 648, Laws of 1973; and 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354) declared inapplicable by chapter
611, Laws of 1973. Compare the similar procedures followed by the Maryland State Bar
Association Section of Real Property, Planning and Zoning Law in its revision of article
21 Md. Ann. Code art. 21, § 14-114 (1973).
193. Staff Memorandum No. 1 to the Subcommittee on Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings (June 16, 1971).
194. Subcommittee Minutes 1 (July 29, 1971). It was thought that this division was
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dance and pay (subtitle 2); attendance of out-of-state witness
(subtitle 3); and foreign depositions (subtitle 4).
Perhaps the major innovation attempted in title 9 was the
codification of common law or case law rules of evidence not
previously contained in article 35 or elsewhere in the Code. Sec-
tions 9-101 and 9-103, as contained in the first reader copy of
Senate Bill 1, took this approach by providing that in general a
person was deemed competent to testify unless otherwise pro-
vided in the subtitle and by specifying rules concerning testimony
by persons of unsound mind and by infants. The thought was that
it would be more useful for the code user to have a full and
comprehensive statutory code of evidence, as opposed to rules of
evidence partially statutory and partially only discoverable by
extensive research in case reports and texts; the objective was to
restate uncodified rules of evidence without change.
The General Assembly rejected this approach. There was
concern about the accuracy of the statutory restatement of case
law. There were also doubts about the wisdom of encysting case
law in the Code, which perhaps would inhibit its flexible applica-
tion and further development. As a result, the original sections
9-101, 9-102, and 9-103 were stricken from the bill, and a new
section 9-101 was inserted.'95
As might be expected, the Dead Man's statute caused con-
siderable drafting problems. 9 ' The Commission's objective was to
make no substantive change whatsoever, and the division of for-
mer article 35, section 3 into two sections, sections 9-116 and 9-
117, was intended to, and probably did, clarify the law. However,
the Commission's general purpose to preserve the Dead Man's
statute, as construed, without change may not have been ex-
pressed with sufficient clarity. At least one distinguished com-
mentator on Maryland's law of evidence has suggested that it
would be difficult to construe section 9-116 as not changing the
law in some respects."7 Appropriately, corrective action has been
consistent with digest and textbook treatment of the subject. The full Commission ap-
proved the change. Commission Minutes (Sept. 13, 1971). See also Subcommittee Min-
utes 15-16 (Apr. 12, 1973).
195. Amendment No. 69, adopted in the Senate. The statutory reference, however,
to the attorney-client privilege in section 9-108 was left untouched. Also left untouched
was the press-shield law [Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 2 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Art., § 9-112 (1974)] because of the legislative rejection of any change at the regular
1973 session of the General Assembly. Commission Minutes 37 (May 6-7, 1973).
196. See Subcommittee Minutes 14 (Apr. 12, 1973); Staff Report No. 33 at 3 (May
1, 1973); Commission Minutes 37 (May 6-7, 1973).
197. See letter from Professor John M. Brumbaugh, University of Maryland School
of Law, to J. Kemp Bartlett, Director, Code Revision Commission (Jan. 16, 1974).
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undertaken."'
The care with which the joint legislative committees re-
viewed the Courts Article is again evident in title 9. Legislative
amendments to sections 9-115, 9-116, and 9-117 were all designed
to clarify restatement of pre-existing law and to avoid unintended
substantive change."' One small substantive change was made in
the title, however. Former article 26, section 148(a) provided a
penalty of $300 for failure of a summonsed witness to appear and
testify in District Court. An older statute, article 35, section 14,
provided a penalty of $50 for a similar offense in the circuit court.
The Commission thought that this difference had no basis in
reason and proposed adopting the article 26 provisions." ° The
General Assembly, by enacting section 9-102, agreed.20'
TITLE 10: EVIDENCE
The nine subtitles of title 10, containing a large number of
uniform acts,2 2 include: proof of accounts and records; public
statutes, office copies, and official certificate; motor vehicle laws;
wire tapping; foreign laws; foreign debt; foreign judgments; si-
multaneous death; and miscellaneous rules. In general, only sty-
listic changes have been made in the uniform acts, although con-
solidation of repetitive provisions has also occurred.
For example, former article 35, sections 67 and 82, and chap-
ter 708 of the Acts of 1973, contained numerous and often reitera-
tive provisions relating to the admissibility of the records of a
variety of State agencies. The substance of these former sections
have been restated in a single section, section 10-204, which is
applicable to records of all State and local agencies, subject to the
confidentiality provisions of section 10-205. Likewise, provisions
relating to the proof of local ordinances and regulations have been
198. See S.B. 766, 1974 Session of the General Assembly, introduced by the Presi-
dent of the Senate on February 28, 1974. This bill was vetoed by Governor Mandel. The
Governor stated in his veto message of May 31, 1974 that the bill had a defective title,
thereby violating Article III, Section 29 of the Constitution.
199. Amendments 70-73, adopted in the Senate.
200. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 63-64
(July 16, 1963).
201. Although the Commission thought that many of the provisions relating to
compensation of witnesses were "irrational and frequently obsolete," it concluded that
modernization of these laws was a policy matter for the General Assembly. Id. at 64.
202. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 10-102-Uniform Photographic Cop-
ies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act; § 10-202-Uniform Proof of Statutes
Act; Subtitle 5-Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act; Subtitle 7-Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act; and Subtitle 8-Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act [1974].
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consolidated in section 10-203.2103
Conceivably, this process of consolidation may have gone a
bit far. For example, former article 35, section 40 was repealed as
obsolete."4 However, a noted commentator has pointed out that
while section 10-204 adequately covers domestic public records,
it may not apply to foreign public records. 0 5 He observes, never-
theless, that a federal statute"'6 solves most of the problem.
The most noteworthy feature of title 10, however, is the treat-
ment of two constitutional problems. The first problem arose
when the Commission proposed the repeal of article 35, sections
5 and 6 (sometimes in part referred to as the "Bouse Act") relat-
ing to use of illegally-seized evidence. 7 It was thought that the
prohibition against use of illegally-seized evidence was rendered
unnecessary by Mapp v. Ohio °0 and its progeny and that other
portions of those sections purporting to admit some illegally-
seized evidence were rendered unconstitutional by the same
cases; this recommendation was accepted by the General Assem-
bly.
Secondly, the Commission attempted to address a problem
relating to wire-tapping. In State v. Siegal, °9 the Court of Ap-
peals invalidated former article 35, section 94(f), on the grounds
that its provisions were less restrictive than the pertinent federal
statute."" Subsequently, at the 1973 regular session, the General
Assembly enacted H.B. 962, which revised Maryland's
interceptions of communications laws to make them conform
substantially to provisions in the federal law, including measures
permitting wire-taps under circumstances in which State law pro-
hibited them. Governor Mandel vetoed the bill, saying that its
effect would be "to allow the police, and anyone else, to intercept,
listen in, and record the private conversations of people when
only one party to the conversation has given consent to such
activity"; he also indicated that he thought that this "opportun-
ity for unwarranted spying and intrusions on people's priva-
cy. . .is frightening ....
203. As rewritten by Amendment No. 82, adopted in the Senate.
204. Ch. 2, § 1, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 332.
205. See note 197 supra.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1970).
207. Commission Minutes 31 (May 6-7, 1973).
208. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
209. 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972), aff'g, 13 Md. App. 444, 285 A.2d 671 (1971).
210. Omnibus Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518 (4)(e) and 2518(5) (1970).
211. [1973] Md. Laws 1924-25 (Veto Message of June 1, 1973). This veto was
sustained at the 1973 Special Session.
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In the light of this judicial and legislative history, the Code
Revision Commission drafted a provision intended only to correct
the deficiency perceived in Siegal.21 However, the joint Senate
Judicial Proceedings and House Judiciary Committee took the
position that the entire wire-tapping law needed rewriting and
that the Commission's proposal represented only a "band-aid"
approach. Accordingly, an amendment was adopted to restore to
section 10-403 the precise language invalidated in Siegal.213
While the General Assembly was indulging in this perhaps
dubious exercise of restoring to the Code provisions stricken down
by both of the appellate courts of the State, it and the Commis-
sion were overlooking another problem of possible conflict with
federal wire-tapping law. Former article 26, section 145(b)(6), as
enacted by chapter 528, Acts of 1970, gave every District Court
judge "the power to issue warrants . . for search and seizure or
for interception of communications, when and in the manner au-
thorized by law . . . ." This law was intended to give District
Court judges the same wire-tap authority as judges at the circuit
court level and was duly written into section 10-403. However,
federal law in 1970 and at the present time indicates that inter-
ception of communications may be authorized only by a judge of
any court "of general criminal jurisdiction of a State . "214
Whether the District Court of Maryland falls within this category
seems highly debatable. Thus, although there are no cases
construing the federal provision, it appears that the wire-tapping
portion of title 10 may require further legislative attention. 215
TITLE 11: JUDGMENTS
Most of the titles of the Courts Article are in large part based
on a single article of the 1957 Code.216 Title 11 is unusual in that
it can claim no such lineage. It seeks to collect a variety of provi-
sions, found in such diverse locations as articles 9, 16, 17, 26, 29,
50, 75, 83 and 85, relating to the measure of damages (subtitle 2),
interest on judgments (subtitle 3), judgment liens (subtitle 4),
212. This provision appears in the first reader copy of S.B. 1 [1974] at section 10-
403 of the Courts Article.
213. Amendment No. 85, adopted in the Senate.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(b) (1970). The writer thanks Chief Judge Sweeney of the
District Court for bringing this point to his attention.
215. H.B. 384, 1974 regular session, if enacted, would resolve the District Court
problem by deleting wire-tapping authority for judges of that court. It would also resolve
the Siegal problem. However, this bill was not enacted.
216. For example, title 4 is derived chiefly from former article 26; title 8 from former
article 51; titles 9 and 10 from former article 35; and title 12 from former article 5.
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execution (subtitle 5), pleas by garnishees (subtitle 6), District
Court judgments (subtitle 7), and miscellaneous matters (subti-
tle 1).
The reader will immediately observe that title 11 constitutes
far less than a comprehensive treatment of the law relating to
judgments and their enforcement. In point of fact, there is rela-
tively little statutory material bearing on the subject, much hav-
ing been left to case law and rule. Title 11, accordingly, could be
construed merely as a respository for most of the Code provisions.
However, in a few instances, obsolete provisions were deleted.' 7
In others, the effects of judicial decisions have been written into
the statutes, t5 and a number of former statutory provisions have
been repealed because covered by rule."'
A minor substantive change appears in section 11-504, which
reduces from two to one the number of appraisers required in
connection with property claimed as exempt from execution. This
change was made because of the reported difficulty of obtaining
appraisers in some parts of the State. During discussion of this
change at the special session, questions were raised about the
need for any appraisers, at least absent a dispute about the value
of the property claimed as exempt. In the fall of 1973, the House
Judiciary Committee studied the matter and recommended to
the Legislative Council that the section "be amended to provide
that the sheriff himself. . .perform this appraisal, but that if
either the judgment creditor or the defendant objects to the val-
uation. . ., then the sheriff shall obtain a disinterested appraiser
to value the property selected."220 An appropriate bill was intro-
duced at the 1974 legislative session.22" '
One other alteration worthy of note is the General Assem-
bly's amendment of section 11-507, providing that exemptions
from execution do not impair certain liens. The law already re-
217. For example, section 11-103 eliminates obsolete references to terms of court
formerly contained in article 26, section 19 of the 1957 Code.
218. Section 11-201 (formerly article 75, section 41) incorporates the judicial con-
struction contained in Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 102 A.2d 739 (1954).
See also Strathmore Mining Co. v. Bayard Coal & Coke Co., 139 Md. 355, 115 A. 620
(1921); and Mount Savage George's Creek Coal Co. v. Monahan, 132 Md. 654, 104 A. 480
(1918).
219. Examples include article 17, section 20 (MD. R. P. 619); article 50, section 4
(MD. R. P. 622); and several portions of article 26, sections 147 and 150 (MD. R. P. 607,
624, 625, and 642).
220. See Legislative Council of Maryland, Report of the Judiciary Committee to the
General Assembly of 1974 at 308-09.
221. H.B. 387 [1974]. Although clearing a vote in the House, this bill did not get
the requisite number of votes in the Senate.
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ferred to purchase money liens on land, mechanics liens, tax
liens, and mortgage liens. The legislature added liens of deeds of
trust and other security interests, on the theory that this was
consistent with the basic intent of the law.222
It should be pointed out that the District Court provisions in
subtitle 7 are extremely brief. Judgment lien provisions appear in
section 11-402, and many former statutes dealing with District
Court judgments are found in rules.2" Section 11-701 is intended
chiefly as a statutory basis for the rules .14
TITLE 12: APPEALS, CERTIORARI, AND CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
This title is probably one of the most interesting of the
Courts Article, since it illustrates many of the fundamental con-
cepts of formal code revision. To begin with, there is the matter
of organization and structure. Article 5 of the 1957 Code was
organized on the basis of the court to which the appeal is to be
taken. Thus, its two major subtitles were "Appeals to Court of
Appeals" and "Appeals to Circuit Courts for Counties and Supe-
rior Court of Baltimore City." That scheme of organization pre-
supposed that the lawyer who wanted to take an appeal knew to
which court he should go. The Code Revision Commission
thought it more useful to organize the title on the basis of the
court from which the appeal was to be taken; while a lawyer who
has just lost a case knows in what court he was unsuccessful, he
may not know what court has jurisdiction over the appeal.225
Thus, following the definitions in subtitle 1, the title includes
subtitle 2, "Review of Cases in Court of Special Appeals"; subti-
tle 3, "Review of Decisions of Trial Courts of General Jurisdic-
tion"; subtitle 4, "Review of Decisions of District Court"; and
subtitle 5, "Review of Decisions of Orphans' Courts." The re-
maining two subtitles deal with certification of questions of law
and practice on appeal.
Also, from the organizational point of view, article 5 provi-
sions dealing with costs on appeal were placed in title 7 of the
Courts Article with other statutes dealing with court costs. 26 For-
mer sections 27 and 29 of article 5, relating to appeals from county
commissioners, were also transferred to article 25.227 The latter
222. Amendment No. 93, adopted by the Senate.
223. See note 219; supra.
224. See Commission Minutes 36 (May 6-7, 1973).
225. See Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 75-
76 (July 16, 1973).
226. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 7-103 (1974).
227. Ch. 2, § 5, [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 396. These particular provi-
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action is consistent with the Commission policy of excluding from
the Courts Article statutes dealing with appeals from administra-
tive agencies and local governmental bodies. These statutes differ
greatly in detail, and are more conveniently codified with the
substantive law to which they pertain. 218
Another facet of code revision illustrated by title 12 is limited
substantive change. This is best exemplified by section 12-301,
authorizing an appeal from the final judgment of a trial court of
general jurisdiction. 29 Article 5, section 1 of the 1957 Code con-
tained similar language. What the former statute did not disclose
was an exception to the general rule developed by case law. That
exception prohibited an appeal from a final judgment of a law
court if the judgment was entered in the exercise of special, origi-
nal, limited, statutory jurisdiction conferred on the court. In such
cases, an appeal was permitted only if specifically provided for
by statute.23 °
At the September 7, 1972, Commission meeting, it was
pointed out that "the present statute is a trap for the unwary
.... ,"231 Article 5, section 1 was especially a pitfall for the legis-
lative draftsman, who could have created a special jurisdiction
thinking that appellate review was provided by the general ap-
peals statute.232 Therefore, the Commission thought that the sub-
stantive law required modification in the interests of fairness and
clarity. 33 The legislature agreed, and section 12-301 now permits
an "appeal. . .from a final judgment entered by a court in the
exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless
in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by
law." '234 However, it should be noted that this change does not
sions in fact would only apply in road opening and closing cases such as those of Urbana
Civil Ass'n v. Urbana Mobile Village, 260 Md. 458, 272 A.2d 628 (1971); Ertler v. North
Washington Cemetary, 200 Md. 251, 88 A.2d 578 (1952).
228. See Staff Report No. 13 at 7 (Aug. 25, 1972). See also Code Revision Commis-
sion, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 76 (July 16, 1973).
229. For a perceptive discussion of the effect of the adoption of section 12-301 in
general, and as applied to appeals in juvenile causes in particular, see Chief Judge Orth's
able opinion in Matter of Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A.2d 540 (1974).
230. See Simpler v. State ex rel. Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 165 A.2d 464 (1960). Compare
Montchester Gun Club, Inc. v. Honga River Gun Club, Inc., 257 Md. 79, 262 A.2d 372
(1970).
231. Commission Minutes 15 (Sept. 7, 1972).
232. For example, after the decision in Simpler, the legislature promptly enacted
chapter 49, Laws of 1962, providing for an appeal in the Simpler situation.
233. Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 77-78
(July 16, 1973).
234. The insertion of this language has made it possible to repeal numerous special
appeal provisions, such as former article 7, section 18 (appeals from arbitration awards)
and former article 31A, section 7 (appeals from declaratory judgments).
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permit an appeal as of right when the court of general trial juris-
diction is itself acting in an appellate capacity, as, for example,
when it is reviewing the decision of the District Court or an ad-
ministrative agency.23s
Another minor substantive change is found in section 12-402,
providing for appeals from the District Court in contempt cases.
Formerly, those appeals had to be noted within ten days from the
contempt order.236 The Commission, however, saw no reason why
the basic 30-day rule should not apply in cases of this sort. On
the other hand, several provisions for short appeal times in cer-
tain landlord-tenant cases were preserved because there seemed
to be valid policy reasons supporting them.2 7
A third, and even more minor, substantive modification is
found in section 12-305, which deals with discretionary review of
the decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction acting in an
appellate capacity. Former article 5, section 21 permitted such
review when, inter alia, "the same statute has been construed
differently by the courts of two or more circuits." But the prior
law did not address the problem of different constructions of the
same statute by two or more judges in a multi-judge county.2 38
Section 12-305(1) attempts to fill that gap by permitting, al-
though not requiring, grant of certiorari if "the same statute has
been construed differently by two or more judges."' 9
Albeit that limited substantive change is one facet of code
revision represented by title 12, one of the more difficult problems
addressed by the Commission in this area was codification of
judicial decisions. One example of the resolution of this problem
is section 12-702, dealing with sentencing following an appeal,
which melds statutory enactment with judicial pronouncement.
In this regard, the first sentence of section 12-702(d) has as its
basis former article 5, section 17, which provided, in effect, that
upon remand for sentencing, the trial court should give credit for
time served by the defendant under the previous sentence from
the date of his conviction. Embodied in the second sentence of
subsection (a) is the holding in Wright v. State,24 which provided
that if the original sentence had been a statutory maximum sen-
235. See MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-302(a) (1974).
236. See Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 148(c) (1973).
237. See MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-401(b)(2) (1974).
238. See Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 78-
79 (July 16, 1973).
239. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-305(1) (1974).
240. 11 Md. App. 673, 276 A.2d 411 (1971).
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tence, the resentencing court also had to give credit for pre-
conviction incarceration related to the same offense.
This subsection, however, does not reach the issue of whether
credit must be given for pre-conviction incarceration if the
sentence was less than the statutory maximum. Although in
State v. Ewell"' the Court of Appeals answered that question in
the negative, implications from subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions242 could arguably be thought to necessitate a statutory over-
ruling of the Ewell decision. The determination of this issue was
expressly left open by the Court of Special Appeals in Wright,
and the Commission, following its generally conservative ap-
proach, proposed no action in this regard, preferring to await
either further development of the case law or specific action by
the General Assembly 2 43
One of the Supreme Court decisions, North Carolina v.
Pearce,2 4 which raised questions about the validity of the Ewell
decision raised other questions as well. After that decision, the
Court of Special Appeals decided Cherry v. State241 and applied
the Pearce limitations on sentence increase to a sentence follow-
ing a de novo appeal. The Pearce decision is codified in section
12-702 (b) and the Cherry decision in section 12-702 (c). 2 146 While,
however, Pearce remains generally good law, Cherry was in effect
overruled by Colten v. Kentucky,247 in which a divided Supreme
Court concluded that the Pearce restrictions on increased sen-
tences did not apply to sentences after de novo appeals. This has
caused some to argue that codification of decisions, especially
Supreme Court decisions, is unwise, because those decisions are
subject to change.
This view, however, is short-sighted and almost irresponsi-
ble. A decision of the Supreme Court on a constitutional point is
241. 234 Md. 56, 198 A.2d 275 (1964).
242. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), in which strict limitations
were placed on increasing sentences after appeal; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), in which federal double jeopardy standards were applied to the states.
243. See Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 81
(July 16, 1973). In this connection, ch. 605, [1973] Md. Laws 1257 should be consulted.
The Criminal Code drafted by the Governor's Commission on Criminal Law would man-
date credit for all pre-trial incarceration. See section 70.30.3 of its proposed Criminal
Code, Governor's Commission on Criminal Law, Interim Report and Preliminary Print of
Provisions Relating to Sentences, Proposed Criminal Code 51 (Oct. 16, 1971).
244. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
245. 9 Md. App. 1416, 264 A.2d 887 (1970).
246. Actually, the Cherry rule was written into former article 5, section 43, by
chapter 181, Laws of 1972, and was simply recodified in section 12-702(c). The Pearce rule
was not expressly codified until enactment of the Courts Article.
247. 407 U.S. 104 (1973).
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the law of the-land. To have statutes which purport to permit
something, such as increasing sentences after appeal, when au-
thoritative court decisions say that action is not permitted, pro-
duces confusion at best and chaos at worst.248 The wiser course,
it would seem, is to amend the law to comply with judicial con-
structions of the Constitution. Should a judicial construction sub-
sequently be changed, the statute can always be amended, if the
legislature so desires. In the meantime, a degree of harmony and
consistency is maintained.249
TITLE 13: COURT SUPPORTING AGENCIES
The last title of the Courts Article was the first to be
drafted.5 0 It was, in fact, selected as an exercise in drafting be-
cause it is short, simple, and uncontroversial. Its brevity is illus-
trated by the fact that title 13 includes only four subtitles. The
title covers the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Ad-
ministrative Office of the Seventh Circuit (subtitle 1); the State
Reporter (subtitle 2); the Standing Committee on Rules (subtitle
3); and the Commission on Judicial Disabilities (subtitle 4).
Statutes relating to the Board of Law Examiners"' were not in-
cluded, because they are allocated to the future Occupations and
Professions Article, where many other licensing statutes will
appear.252
A few minor changes appear in title 13, mostly for conformity
to actual practice or for internal consistency. For example, former
article 26, section 6 permitted the Director of the State Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts to be a part-time employee. That
provision is omitted from section 13-101, because the duties of the
office require full-time attention. For the same reason, section 13-
101(c) makes it clear that neither the director nor any employee
of his office may practice law in any jurisdiction.253
248. This was the situation prior to July 1, 1972, when chapter 181 became effective;
see note 241 supra. Prior to that date, article 5, section 43 of the Code provided: "If the
defendant so appealing is convicted in said trial de novo on appeal the Criminal Court of
Baltimore may impose any sentence authorized by law . . . irrespective of the sentence
imposed in the Municipal Court." This was plainly contrary to the decision in Cherry.
249. Although Colten was decided in 1973, the General Assembly has not yet
amended what is now section 12-702(c) of the Courts Article. However, the Legislative
Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference has recommended its repeal. Minutes of
Meeting of Steering Committee of Legislative Committee of the Judicial Conference 1
(Jan. 16, 1974).
250. Commission Minutes (June 15, 1972).
251. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 2-8 (1968, Supp. 1973).
252. See Code Revision Commission, Revisor's Manual (2d ed. Nov. 1973) at A-9.
253. See Code Revision Commission, Report No. 3F to the General Assembly, at 82
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From the viewpoint of code revision in general, however, title
13 was the vehicle for an ill-fated experiment with skip-number-
ing.5 4 One of the problems facing code revision is that of inserting
new material, adopted by subsequent legislative action, in the
logically appropriate location. If sections are numbered consecu-
tively, and a new section is to be placed between, let us say,
section 13-101 and section 13-102, there are several alternatives.
One is to renumber all sections, but this is troublesome and
makes referencing and indexing difficult. Another is to use a capi-
tal letter (section 13-101A) or a decimal number (section 13-
101.1) or a fraction (section 13-1011/2), but these methods can
produce complex and confusing numbers.
Another alternative is skip-numbering whereby sections are
not numbered consecutively, but rather gaps of five or ten or more
numbers are left between the original sections. Thus, at least
initially, insertions may be made without difficulty. However,
since it is difficult to estimate how rapidly law will expand, it is
not easy to determine how wide the gaps should be, and when
they have all been filled, the basic problem is again presented.
Moreover, there are those who contend that the existence of gaps
is in itself confusing. Because of these difficulties, the Commis-
sion rejected the concept of skip-numbering;25 insertions are to
be handled by a decimal system.356
The "Back of the Bill"
No discussion of code revision vis-a-vis the Courts Article
would be complete without brief mention of what the Commis-
sion staff referred to as "The back of the bill." The "back of the
bill" encompasses the twenty sections following section 1 of Sen-
ate Bill 1,257 containing the text of the Courts Article, which
include repealers (section 2) and transfers (section 3) plus a num-
ber of other sections designed to implement the concepts of code
(July 16, 1973). Similar anti-practice provisions were inserted in section 13-102(c), appli-
cable to the Seventh Circuit Administrative Office, after consultation with the judges on
the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit Administrative Office is the only local adminis-
trative office discussed in the Courts Article because it was established by public general
law. The Supreme Bench Administrator was established by chapter 224, Laws of 1966, a
public local law, while Baltimore and Montgomery Counties have provided local adminis-
trators without enabling legislation.
254. Staff Report No. 12 at 16 (June 12, 1972).
255. See Commission Minutes 13 (June 15, 1972).
256. Code Revision Commission, Revisor's Manual (2d ed. Nov. 1973) 8-9. Inserted
subtitles, however, will be indicated by capital letters.
257. Ch. 2 [1973 Extraordinary Sess.] Md. Laws 4.
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revision by permitting the repeal of entire former articles or other-
wise making changes consistent with revision policies."' These
other sections include sections 6, 7,259 8, 9 and 10, which transfer
to article .27 various statutes so related to criminal law that they
could not appropriately be included in the Courts Article, and
section 12 which transfers the judicial pension statutes of former
article 26 to article 73B, where they are placed with other sections
dealing with State pensions and retirement benefits.26 ° The re-
maining sections deal with construction and interpretation of the
Courts Article and its effective date.
A full understanding of the Courts Article and the scope of
revision associated with it cannot be obtained without considera-
tion of these sections. While detailed discussion of them is not
necessary here, the Code user should be aware of their existence.
THE IMMEDIATE AND MORE DISTANT FUTURE
By July 1, 1975, over one-third of the projected revised Code
should be in effect;2"' the task should be completed by July 1,
1979. Of course, the process of code revision is neither short nor
simple. Despite the difficulties and temporary drawbacks and
despite the fact that errors in the revision will surface from time
to time, Code revision in Maryland shows great promise. Al-
though some might paraphrase Dr. Johnson's comment about a
woman preaching and say, "It is not done well; but you are sur-
prised to find it done at all,"2 2 it is submitted, as this article
suggests, that real advances are being made in the organization
and style of the Code through the process of code revision.
258. One example of such a transfer was the shift of former sections 27 and 29 of
article 5 to article 25 in order to permit repeal of article 5. Actually, this purpose was not
accomplished. Through an oversight, article 5, section 22 was not repealed. However, this
has been corrected by the enactment of S.B. 1070 (Ch. 691, [1974] Md. Laws 2354), and
the adoption of an appropriate rule by the Court of Appeals.
259. At the Special Session, the General Assembly inserted section 7A to clarify
article 27, section 592, as enacted by chapter 840, Laws of 1973, with respect to procedures
relating to indictment, information and preliminary hearings. Amendment No. 95,
adopted by the Senate.
260. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
261. The Agriculture and Natural Resources Articles as well as the article on Court
& Judicial Proceedings were enacted during the First Special Session in 1973. At the 1974
Session, the General Assembly enacted the revised articles on Estates and Trusts and on
Real Property, Ch. 11 and 12, [1974] Md. Laws 17 and 248 respectively. Revised articles
on Commercial Law, Corporations, and Public Health are to be considered at the 1975
legislative session.
262. That well-known male chauvinist of the eighteenth century is reputed to have
remarked: "Sir, a woman preaching is like a dog's walking on his hind legs. It is not done
well; but you are surprised to find it done at all." 1 J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF DR. JOHNSON 287.
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Benefits will be realized through the closing of gaps and with
the elimination of inconsistencies, conflicts, and unconstitutional
provisions. More importantly, the refining process of Code revi-
sion will bring to general attention numerous problems of policy
and substantive law, often unrecognized in the past. In other
words, the process of formal revision in itself generates a healthy
interest in substantive revision of both public general and public
local laws.263
It is not too much to hope that the Code Revision Commis-
sion and the General Assembly will adhere to the high standards
so far followed. To avoid erosion of the benefits of code revision,
steps must be taken to guarantee that a well-written, well-
organized Code is not allowed to fall into a poorly-written and
disorganized state merely because no one pays attention to edi-
torial and organizational matters. The early establishment of a
continuing revision process is essential in order to insure that
form is at least on a parity with substance. 6' Beginning now, the
Division of Statutory Revision must set up procedures for review-
ing all bills to make sure that they are consistent with the stylistic
and organizational guidelines now established.2"5
263. Several detailed comments on this process have already been made. Numerous
other examples will be found in bills filed during the 1974 session of the General Assembly.
It might also be noted that following the 1973 Special Session, the Commission itself
submitted 47 such suggestions in the courts area alone to legislative committees. These
suggestions were largely gleaned from comments made during committee hearings of the
Special Session. See letters of August 8 and August 16, 1973 from Revisor of Statutes to
Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings and House Judiciary Committees.
264. Recognizing the interdependence of form and substance, the General Assembly
required the Division of Statutory Revision, created in 1972, to
carry on the work of continuous formal revision of the statutory law of the State by
preparing and submitting recommendations to the General Assembly for the repeal,
amendment, or other modification of any statute which is obsolete, antiquated, in
conflict with another statute, or inconsistent with another statute; or which has
been declared unconstitutional or otherwise is in need of formal revision . ..
[and to] make recommendations to correct manifest spelling, grammatical, cleri-
cal, or typographical errors, or errors by way of additions or omissions, as well as
generally to maintain the clarity, simplicity, and consistency of style of statutory
law.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 53C(3) (Supp. 1973).
265. An outstanding example of failure to do this is H.B. 1588, 1974 Regular Session
which died in the General Assembly. The thrust of this bill was to abolish the doctrine of
intrafamily immunity in tort. For some reason, the draftsman had elected to do this by
an amendment to section 9-105 of the Courts Article. Basically, this portion of the wit-
nesses title deals with confidential communications between spouses.
Machinery to accomplish the review of bills is provided by Rule 31 of the Maryland
Senate and Rule 31 of the House of Delegates. Each of these Rules provides that no bill
may be filed unless first approved by the Department of Legislative Reference as to form
and codification. Intensified training of legislative bill drafters would also help assure that
Code revision concepts are adhered to in the regular work of the General Assembly.
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Among the procedures which will help to accomplish these
ends are those designed to improve the handling of so-called
"corrective bills." The Maryland Constitution requires that the
General Assembly, "in amending any article, or section of the
Code of Laws of this State, . . . [shall] enact the same, as the
said Article, or section would read when amended.""26 This means
that the most trivial correction of a typographical error, a stylistic
gaffe, a punctuation mistake, or the misstatement of an agency
name must be corrected by a full-blown legislative act. The same
is true of changes in organization of the laws even though they
do not change substance. This requirement clearly obstructs the
work of the Revisor of Statutes in his capacity as guardian of the
stylistic and organizational purity of the revised Code; it is also
an expensive process. 267
This procedure need not be followed. At least 15 states em-
ploy simpler, less expensive methods for editing their Codes,
when no substantive change is involved. 268 Typical is the State of
Washington, which allows the Code Revisor, under the supervi-
sion of a committee, to apply uniform style guidelines, insert
proper dates, "[r]earrange any misplaced statutory material",
correct spelling, clerical, or typographical errors, correct errors in
numbering and references, divide long sections into two or more
sections, "rearrange the order of sections to conform to logical
arrangement of subject matter," reword section captions, delete
"provisions manifestly obsolete," and perform numerous other
editorial functions. 29 Although the revisor may not make a sub-
stantive change in the law, he may perform his editorial tasks
without the necessity of legislation.
Techniques like this should be applied in Maryland. Serious
attention should be given to the adoption of a Constitutional
amendment and the implemention of legislation which would in
substance permit the Revisor of Statutes to submit an annual
report to the General Assembly, proposing appropriate editorial
and organizational changes in the Code. This report could be
266. Mn. CONST. art. III, § 29 (1972).
267. According to data prepared in 1973, it costs $25.74 per page to print a bill,
exclusive of the services of the bill drafter. At the 1973 regular session, there were about
60 corrective bills, totaling 246 pages. Thus, the cost of printing these bills was $6,332.04.
Letter and attached memoranda forwarded by the writer to Hon. Thomas Hunter Lowe,
Chairman, Legislative Council Committee on Rules, Organization and Facilities (June 18,
1973). The financial analysis was largely performed by legal intern Jon H. Shoup.
268. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Washington.
269. WASH. REv. CODE Ann. § 1.08.015 (1961).
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rejected in whole or in part by the General Assembly, but, to the
extent not rejected, it would take effect and become part of the
Code. A procedure such as this would save some money, conserve
a good deal of legislative time, and allow efficient, thorough, con-
tinuous editorial supervision of the style, arrangement, and or-
ganization of the revised Code. It would, in effect, comply with
the article 40 mandate for "continuous formal revision. '2 70
Secondly, a study needs to be undertaken to determine the
best and least expensive way of making the new Code available
to the greatest number of Code users. Already, the format of the
new Code means that individuals interested only in specific sub-
ject areas may purchase only the volume or volumes relating to
their areas instead of an entire set of the Code. However, the
matter does not end here; there is much to be said for the proposi-
tion that a State that enacts laws has a duty to make the printed
volumes of those laws available to its citizens promptly and inex-
pensively. Should Maryland print and publish its own edition of
the Code, annotated, or unannotated? Should the Code be up-
dated by pocket parts, by supplemental pamphlets, by loose-leaf
services, or by other means? Various states use various methods,
and State publication of s~ne form of Code by no means pre-
cludes private publication of another edition of the same Code.
In conclusion, the achievements so far demonstrated in the
Code revision process and the collateral benefits which this pro-
cess inevitably generates make it reasonable to hope that when
the project has been completed
the citizens of this State will be the beneficiaries of a body
of public general laws organized in a logical fashion and
written in a clear, non-technical style. The General Assem-
bly will have produced for the public laws which are easier
to find and, once found, easier to understand. In a society in
which every citizen is presumed to know the law, and in
which statutory law plays an increasingly important part in
everyone's life, the importance of this project is obvious.271
270. MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 53 C (3), (Supp. 1973). See also Staff Memorandum
No. 4 to the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning, "A Continuous Revision Program,"
(Aug. 24, 1971, revised Sept. 17, 1971 and May 13, 1972).
271. Opening statement of Revisor of Statutes to joint meeting of Senate Judicial
Proceedings and House Judiciary Committees (July 30, 1973).
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